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INTRODUCTION

Bank accounts originated with seventeenth-century goldsmiths
located in London's Lombard Street.1 Gold was then an index of
wealth but presented storage problems-especially after Charles I
raided the traditional gold repository, the Tower of London, in 1640
for an involuntary loan of £200,000. Goldsmiths provided a solution:
since they handled and stored gold everyday, they offered, for a fee,
safe storage of the gold and agreed to return it to the customer upon
his request. This relationship between goldsmith and client was thus
one rooted in property concepts; title to the gold remained with the
customer, and the goldsmith was a caretaker-technically, a bailee2
of the metal.
Wealth, however, is not useful unless it can be used or spent. The
owners of gold realized this and also realized it was a nuisance to send
down to the goldsmiths for a little gold every now and then to settle
debts or to purchase goods. So instead they gave their creditors and
vendors documents containing directions, or orders. These documents
were addressed to the goldsmiths and directed them to deliver some
of the gold on deposit to the bearer of the document. These
documents were the forerunners of today's checks.3
The system, however, was still rooted in property concepts; the
goldsmith still did not "own" the gold. 4 But goldsmiths were not
dumb; they realized they controlled a tremendous store of fungible
wealth that could be converted into other assets, such as loans. So
long as they were judicious as to whom they lent the gold, and kept
such reserves of gold as were necessary to pay the documents
1. The basics of this history are recounted in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 52-53 (4th ed. 1993). See also J. MILNES HOLDEN,
THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 205-10 (1955).
2. "The owner of a chattel may give to another person possession of the chattel without
giving him the title to the chattel. In such a case a bailment and not a trust is created."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 5 cmt. a (1959). Bailments were recognized by common
law courts long before trusts were recognized by equity courts. See id.
Under a bailment such as existed between the goldsmiths and their customers, in which the
goldsmith undertook to store the gold for a fee, the goldsmiths owed a duty of care to protect
and keep gold given to them. See, e.g., Miller v. Newsweek, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 852, 858-59 (D.
Del. 1987); Gebert v. Yank, 218 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Price v. Brown, 680
A.2d 1149, 1151-52 (Pa. 1996); Ferrick Excavating & Grading Co. v. Senger Trucking Co., 484
A.2d 744, 748 (Pa. 1984); see also 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF
TORTS § 16.13, at 945 (1956). If unable to return the gold upon demand because of a breach of
this duty, the goldsmiths would have been liable to their customers for the value of the gold.
3. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 53.
4. See sources cited supra note 2.
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received, everyone was better off.'
This step, however, changed the complexion and the status of the
relationship between the goldsmith and his customers. Instead of
bailment, the relationship became one of debtor and creditor. Upon
transfer of the gold, the goldsmith simultaneously became the owner
of the gold and a creditor of the customer for its value. Contract rules,
such as they were, governed the rights and responsibilities of the two
parties.6
Thus, the bank account evolved from a property-based concept

into a contract relationship. Under the modern version of this
contract, banks take title to the funds given them and become
debtors; depositors become creditors of the banks with respect to the
amount of such funds.7 In accordance with separate agreements,

entered into against the background of Article 4 of the UCC, the
depositary bank is obligated to pay out on its customer's orders, or
checks.8 In the meantime, banks lend the money transferred to them.

Bank accounts are vital to the economy in several respects. First,
they are valuable and secure, since we treat the person obligated on
the account-the bank-very differently in our legal system than
other debtors. Banks are regulated separately for safety and
soundness. 9 They even have their own insolvency system, 10 which can
5. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 52.
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., New York County Nat'l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 147-49 (1904); United
States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir. 1986); Miller v. Wells Fargo
Bank Int'l Corp., 540 F.2d 548, 560 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. All Funds Presently on
Deposit or Attempted to Be Deposited in Any Accounts Maintained at American Express
Bank, 832 F. Supp. 542, 549 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Interstate Dep't Stores, Inc., 128 B.R.
703, 705 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1991); First Bank v. Samocki Bros. Trucking Co., 509 N.E.2d 187,
198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Trotter v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 378 S.E.2d 267, 269 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12 cmt. 1 (1959) ("A general
deposit of money in a commercial bank does not create a trust, but a relation of debtor and
creditor....").
8. Although the terms of this agreement may vary from contract to contract, the default
rules are set out in Part 4 of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See 1 BARKLEY
CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT
CARDS 3.01[1] (rev. ed. 1999). The principle obligation of a bank is to pay on all checks which
are "properly payable." See U.C.C. § 4-401.
9. A series of laws and regulations cover banks and bank holding companies. See, e.g.,
Federal Deposit Insurance Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (1994); Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, id. §§ 1841-1850; Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3911; 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1999) (safety
and soundness requirement for bank holding companies). The Court discussed the effect of
these rules in a bankruptcy of a bank holding company in Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System v. MCorp Financial,Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1991).
10. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 192 (giving comptroller of currency power to control national

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

.[Vol. 74:963

act with blinding quickness should there be some flaw in the
creditworthiness of a bank.11 Second, bank accounts are the lifeblood

of commerce. Every business has at least one, if not more, and relies
on their efficacy in conducting daily business. 2 To cut out deposit
accounts would be to cut out the very heart of business.
Such a valuable asset has other charms. Just as the goldsmiths of
Lombard Street realized that they could enhance their wealth by
lending the gold entrusted to them, modern debtors realize that they
might be able to leverage their wealth by borrowing against their
deposit accounts. As originally adopted, however, Article 9 excluded
deposit accounts from its coverage as initial, or original, collateral. 3

To give force to the other provisions of Article 9, however, its drafters
brought deposit accounts within Article 9 to the extent they
represented proceeds of collateral within the scope of Article 9.14 The
common law outside of Article 9 continued to govern original security
5
interests in deposit accounts.1

banking association in default). Banks are ineligible to file for relief under federal bankruptcy
law. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)(2) (stating that banks and other financial institutions may not be
debtors under chapter 7 of Bankruptcy Code), 109(d) (1994) (conditioning eligibility to file
under chapter 11 on eligibility to file under chapter 7).
11. See, e.g., FDIC v. Bank One, Waukesha, 881 F.2d 390, 394 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Often the
first that depositors know of the failed bank's trouble is the announcement of the [purchase and
assumption] and the erection of the new owner's sign over the door."). The lawsuits leading to
these seizures are initiated without notice to the bank's owners, and thus the owners typically
find out about the closure at the same time the depositors do. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972) (noting summary seizure of property is permitted "to protect against the
economic disaster of a bank failure"); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947)
(recognizing that suspension of usual procedure is not unconstitutional given "history and
customs of banking").
12. As one indication of the centrality of bank deposits, approximately $371 billion dollars
were held in demand deposit accounts in the United States at the beginning of 1999. See Federal
Reserve Statistical Release (May 20, 1999 update) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/releases/H6/
Current/>. Another $246 billion was held in "other checkable deposits" such as Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal accounts. See id.
In making these observations, I have broken out the demand deposit account data from
M1, a larger measure of money supply, since M2 and other measures include money market
accounts which, under Revised Article 9, would be treated as investment property. See R.
§ 9-102 cmt. 12.
13. See U.C.C. § 9-104(1).
14. See id. The specific treatment of deposit accounts as proceeds was found in section
9-306(2), which gave a right to identifiable proceeds, and in section 9-306(3)(b), which deemed
the secured party to be perfected in such deposit accounts so long as the proceeds were
"identifiable."
15. For an examination of the common law treatment of security interests in deposit
accounts, see Dwight L. Greene, Deposit Accounts as Bank Loan Collateral Beyond Setoff to
Perfection- The Common Law Is Alive and Well, 39 DRAKE L. REv. 259 (1989-1990); and
Alvin C. Harrell, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts: A Unique Relationship Between the
UCC and Other Law, 23 UCC L.J. 153 (1990). Article 9 also excluded setoff rights from its
coverage. See U.C.C. § 9-104(i).
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For the last decade, Article 9 has been undergoing revision. 16 The

final product has now been approved by its two caretakers, the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners for Uniform State Law. 17 Its text and accompanying
comments have been sent to the states for adoption, with a target date
18
of July 1, 2001 for its effectiveness.
Revised Article 9 makes many changes, and with respect to bank

accounts-which Revised Article 9 calls "deposit accounts"-the
changes are significant. Following the lead of many commentators 19
and reversing prior law, Revised Article 9 includes deposit accounts

within its scope, at least to the extent that they are not primarily
deposit accounts held by consumers. 20 Especially in the way this
concept has been implemented in Revised Article 9, we thus have

somewhat of a return to a property concept. The contractual
relationship between bank and customer is now property that the
customer may fully encumber, and an authority no less that Revised
Article 9 will govern the scope, attachment, perfection, priority, and

enforcement of such interests.
16. In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC with the support of its
sponsors, The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, established a committee to study Article 9 of the UCC. The
study committee issued its report as of December 1, 1992, recommending the creation
of a drafting committee for the revision of Article 9 and also recommending numerous
specific changes to Article 9.
R. § 9-101 cmt. 2; see also PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF.
COMMERCIAL CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 68-71 (Dec. 1, 1992)
[hereinafter PEB STUDY].
17. The American Law Institute approved Revised Article 9 at its May 1998 meeting, and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws followed with their approval
at their July 1998 meeting. See R. § 9-101 cmt. 2.
18. Revised section 9-701 provides that Revised Article 9 is to take effect on July 1, 2001.
This delayed effective date will allow private parties to adjust their practices and the private bar
to become familiar with the new terms. See id. § 9-701 cmt.
19. See, e.g., Gerald T. McLaughlin, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts: Unresolved
Problems and Unanswered Questions Under Existing Law, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 45, 87 (1988);
Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Problems with Setoff. A Proposed Legislative Solution, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 51 (1988) (proposing codification of the law of setoff); Luize E. Zubrow,
Integration of Deposit Account Financing into Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 68 MINN. L. REV. 899, 907 (1984); Frances A. Rauer, Note,
Conflicts Between Set-Offs and Article 9 Security Interests, 39 STAN. L. REV. 235, 251-52, 264-65
(1986). As the revision process was ongoing, others added or amplified their views. See Jason M.
Ban, Deposit Accounts: An Article 9 Security Interest, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 493 (1998);
Lee J. Leslie, The Applicability of California Law to the Perfection of Security Interests in
Non-California Deposit Accounts: An Approach for California Lenders, 98 COM. L.J. 245
(1993); Stephen L. Sepinuck, A Defense of Extending Article 9 to Cover Security Interests in
Deposit Accounts as Original Collateral, 1995 COM. LAW ANN. 477 [hereinafter Sepinuck,
Defense].
20. See infra Part II.A.2.
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After briefly reviewing the current law, this article examines
these new provisions, trying to describe how they are intended to
work. The article next examines how parties will likely adapt their
current lending and commercial practices to adapt to Revised Article
9. It concludes with an analysis of some potential problems and policy
shifts these changes will likely bring about.
I. CURRENT LAW
A. Exclusion as OriginalCollateral- UCC Section 9-104(l)
When Article 9 was drafted, the comments acknowledged that
"[r]ights under ... deposit accounts[] are often put up as collateral."'"
Nevertheless, the drafters thought that "[sluch transactions are often
quite special, do not fit easily under a general commercial statute and
are adequately covered by existing law." 22 This led to section
23
9-104(l)'s exclusion of deposit accounts as original collateral.
B. Inclusion as Proceeds Collateral
The drafters also realized that deposit accounts could not be
wholly excluded from a sensible secured transactions law. Other
collateral-equipment, inventory, and accounts-are often sold and
the proceeds deposited with a bank. Unless the secured party's
interest was to stop at the banker's door, recourse to deposit
accounts, at least to the extent they could be said to contain proceeds,
was imperative.
Article 9 recognized this and specifically included deposit
accounts "as provided with respect to proceeds (Section 9-306) and
priorities in proceeds (Section 9-312)."24 Section 9-306, in turn,
extended Article 9 to deposit accounts, but only to the extent that
such accounts contained "identifiable proceeds. ' 2 Identifiability had
an added benefit under the original version of Article 9-no extra
measures to continue perfection in the proceeds in the bank account
21. U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 7.
22. Id.
23. Although authority is scarce, some sources suggest that the drafters excluded deposit
accounts largely for political reasons due to strong opposition by banking interests. See 1
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY

§ 10.7,

at 315-16 (1965);

Greene, supra note 15, at 261 n.4.

24. U.C.C. § 9-104(o.
25. See id. § 9-306(2). Under Article 9, a right in proceeds arises automatically unless the
parties have agreed otherwise. See id. § 9-203(3).
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were necessary so long as the proceeds were "identifiable cash
26
proceeds.
The question of how to identify portions of a seemingly
indivisible obligation-the bank's contractual obligation to pay funds

upon receipt of its customer's order-initially bedeviled
commentators and courts. Grant Gilmore, the principal drafter of
Article 9, weighed in early with the belief that no proceeds could be

identified in any account into which both proceeds and nonproceeds28
had been deposited. 27 Although at least one court followed this,
most did not. 29 The trend settled on the lowest intermediate balance
rule for sorting out the parts of the deposit account attributable to

proceeds; or put technically, courts adopt the lowest intermediate
balance rule to "identify" portions of the deposit account for
purposes of section 9-306(3)(b).3 0
Under the lowest intermediate balance rule, a court recreates the

26. See id. § 9-306(3)(b). This applied, however, only if a "financing statement cover[ed]
the original collateral." Id. As a consequence, proceeds from the sale of consumer goods subject
to a purchase money security interest for which no financing statement was filed could not be
perfected under this subsection (financing statements are not necessary to perfect such an
interest, see id. § 9-302(1)(d)).
27. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 23, § 27.4, at 735-36. A very good analysis of courts'
reactions to Professor Gilmore's position can be found in Richard L. Barnes, Tracing
Commingled Proceeds: The Metamorphosis of Equity Principles into U.C.C. Doctrine, 51 U.
PIrr. L. REV. 281 (1990).
28. See Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 274 A.2d 306, 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
In addition, in In re Littleton, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel declined to apply an equitable
tracing rule because the secured creditor allowed the debtor to commingle proceeds in a general
operating account instead of enforcing its contractual right to have the debtor deposit such
amounts in a segregated account. See 106 B.R. 632,636 (B.A.P.9th Cir. 1989).
29. Barkley Clark collects and analyzes the cases. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 10.03[1] (rev. ed. 1993
& Supp. III 1998). A collection of the trust cases applying the lowest intermediate balance test
in bankruptcy can be found at 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.11 (15th rev. ed. 1997). For a
historical view of the evolution of the absorption of trust tracing comments into commercial law,
see Barnes, supra note 27, at 292-306.
30. As stated by the Iowa Supreme Court, the adoption of a supplementary principle such
as the equitable lowest intermediate balance test is consistent with UCC section 1-103. See C&H
Farm. Serv. v. Farmers Sav. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866, 877 (Iowa 1989); see also First Nat'l Bank v.
Martin (In re Martin), 25 B.R. 25, 27-28 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) ("The rules pertaining to the
rights of a secured creditor to trace the proceeds of his secured collateral are liberally construed
in favor of the creditor as evidenced by the extension of the tracing method known as the
'intermediate balance rule' into the area of commercial law."); Ex Parte Alabama Mobile
Homes, Inc., 468 So.2d 156, 160 (Ala. 1985) ("The rules employed to distinguish the identifiable
proceeds from other funds are liberally construed in the creditor's favor by use of the
'intermediate balance rule."').
Under the lowest intermediate balance rule, courts have required the secured party to bear
the burden of tracing the funds into the account and recreating the lowest intermediate balance.
See, e.g., In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club, Inc., 205 B.R. 407, 412-13 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 41-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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daily balances in the disputed account, noting when deposits were
made and the sources of those deposits. It then applies the

presumption that the debtor will spend his or her own money first,
"leaving" the secured party's proceeds portion behind for the secured
party. The secured party then gets the lowest balance of "pure"
31
proceeds during the relevant time.

In addition to using these rules for resolving disputes among
consensual secured parties, courts also used these rules to determine
the relative priorities of secured parties against lien creditors'
garnishments 32 and against tax liens. 33 A key area of dispute, however,

was the relative rights of a secured party with identifiable proceeds
and the setoff rights of the bank holding the deposit. In these cases,
the secured party generally prevailed. 34
C. The Rogue States and Reform
Against this background, some states did not see the wisdom of
excluding deposit accounts. They enacted nonuniform amendments to
their versions of the Uniform Commercial Code and brought deposit
31. See, for example, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317,
325-27 (E.D. Mo. 1973), for one of the best early statements and applications of the lowest
intermediate balance rule. A more recent example of its application is Security State Bank v.
Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., 965 F. Supp. 1237, 1244-48 (N.D. Iowa 1997). See also General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Norstar Bank, N.A., 532 N.Y.S.2d 685, 688-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988)
(collecting cases).
32. See, e.g., Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 217 S.E.2d 108, 11112 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975). In Marquette National Bank v. B.J. Dodge Fiat, Inc., the court was
prepared to favor the secured party over the garnishor, but found that the secured party had not
met its burden of proof in tracing the funds at issue under the lowest intermediate balance rule.
See 475 N.E.2d 1057, 1062 (Il. Ct. App. 1985).
33. See, e.g., Trust Co. v. United States, 735 F.2d 447, 449-50 (11th Cir. 1984). But see
Peoples Nat'l Bank v. United States, 777 F.2d 459, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Trust Co., but
holding for IRS because bank had not taken steps necessary under Washington common law to
perfect its interest in deposit account).
Treasury regulations under the Federal Tax Lien Act recognize security interests in
proceeds, at least to the extent that attachment of the original collateral occurred within 45 days
of the filing of the lien and to the extent recognized under state law. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(c)l(f), example l(ii) (1998) ("The priority of X's security interest also extends to the proceeds,
received on or after the 46th day after the tax lien filing, from the liquidation of the accounts
receivable and inventory held by M on [the date 45 days after the filing of the tax lien], if X has
a continuously perfected security interest in identifiable proceeds under local law.").
With respect to contests between the IRS and secured parties as to insurance proceeds,
courts have favored the secured parties. See, e.g., Paskow v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 579 F.2d 949,
952-54 (5th Cir. 1978); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58, 60-61 (2d Cir.
1976).
34. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 824 F. Supp. 587, 593 (E.D. La.
1993), afjd, 51 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 1995); Universal CI. T. Credit Corp., 358 F. Supp. at 325-27;
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243, 1246-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); see
also CLARK, supra note 29, at 3.11; Sepinuck, Defense, supra note 19, at 514 & n.102.
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accounts into Article 9. When lending in these states-California,3 5
Hawaii,3 6 Idaho,37 Illinois, 8 and Louisiana 9 -did not crumble, interest
was sparked in including deposit accounts into any revision of Article
9.40

The Permanent Editorial Board Report, which preceded the
drafting of Article 9, recommended the addition of deposit accounts
as permissible original collateral to Article 9. 41 This report adopted
the recommendations of a task force that deposit accounts should be
brought into Article 9. It also evinced a great concern for banks
should non-bank secured parties seek to establish perfected security
interests in deposit accounts, stating that no duties should be owed to
a secured creditor claiming an interest in a deposit account "unless,
and then only to the extent that, the institution [holding the account]
agrees to assume such duties or is served with legal process
concerning the deposit account. '4 The report simply noted that
"serious consideration" should be given to the report's other
recommendations, 43 but that the task force's recommendations on
enforcement by non-bank secured parties "may unnecessarily impede
the flow of funds through the payment system. '"44

35. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(l)(g) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999). California adopted this
change over 25 years ago. See 1974 Cal. Stat. 2125, ch. 997, § 21 (1974).
Under section 9302(1)(g), perfection is automatic upon attachment when the secured party
is the depositary bank, see CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(1)(g)(i), and by notice to the depositary
bank when the secured party is not the bank maintaining the account, see id. § 9302(1)(g)(ii).
36. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:9-302(1)(h) (1993 & Supp. 1997). Hawaii follows
California's perfection scheme. See id. § 490:9-302(1)(h)(i)-(ii).
37. See IDAHO CODE § 28-9-302(1)(j) (Supp. 1998). Idaho also follows California's
perfection scheme. See id. § 28-9-302(1)(j)(i)-(ii).
38. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-302(1)(i) (West 1997). Illinois follows generally the
California perfection scheme, but additionally requires that the organization notified "provide[]
written acknowledgement of and consent to the notice of the secured party." Id.
5/9-302(1)(i)(ii).
39. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-305(4) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). Louisiana follows
the California scheme and makes it clear that filing a financing statement is ineffective: "The
filing of a financing statement is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in a
deposit account." Id.
40. To this list one might add Oklahoma, whose 1994 nonuniform amendment to section
9-105(e) redefined certificates of deposit in such a way that most deposit accounts would be
certificates of deposit and, hence, within Article 9 notwithstanding section 9-104(l). See
Sepinuck, Defense, supra note 19, at 479 n.7.
41. See PEB STUDY, supra note 16, at 68-71.
42. Id. at 68. The task force had recommended that non-bank secured parties be able to
perfect their interest in a deposit account simply by filing a financing statement. See id. at 70.
43. See id. at 68.
44. Id. at 71.
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II. STRUCTURE OF REVISED ARTICLE 9

Revised Article 9 does not specifically state that deposit accounts
may be used as Article 9 collateral. Rather, Revised Article 9 broadly
includes all personal property within its scope and relies on
characterization by non-UCC law of such accounts as personal
property to bring deposit accounts within its scope.4 1 In addition,
Revised Article 9 carries forward existing Article 9's treatment of
such accounts as within Article 9 to the extent that they represent
proceeds of other Article 9 security interests. This part examines this
dual treatment-as original collateral and as proceeds collateralwith respect to the basic elements of secured transactions: coverage,
attachment, perfection, priority, duties and privileges, and
enforcement.
A. Coverage

As indicated earlier, 46 existing Article 9 covers deposit accounts
to the extent that they constitute proceeds of other collateral. Revised
Article 9 continues this treatment and expands it to cover deposit
accounts as original collateral.
1. Definition of "Deposit Account" -Revised Section 9-102(a)(29)
First, the basics. Revised Article 9 defines a "deposit account" as
"a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account maintained
with a bank. The term does not include investment property or
accounts evidenced by an instrument." 47 This brings the definition of
deposit account substantially in accord with the definition of the

45. Revised Article 9 does exclude certain consumer deposit accounts. See R.
§ 9-109(d)(13); infra Part II.A.2.
46. See supra Part I.B.
47. R. § 9-102(a)(29). "Bank," in turn, is defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(8) as "an
organization that is engaged in the business of banking. The term includes savings banks,
savings and loan associations, credit unions, and trust companies." This change substantially
conforms the definition of "bank" to that used in Article 4 of the UCC. See U.C.C. § 4-105(1).
The only difference is that under the definition of "bank" in Revised Article 9, individuals
cannot be banks, while under Article 4 they may be banks. Compare id. ("'Bank' means a
person engaged in the business of banking, including a savings bank, savings and loan
association, credit union, or trust company." (emphasis added)) with R. § 9-102(a)(8) ("'Bank'
means an organization that is engaged in the business of banking. The term includes savings
banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and trust companies." (emphasis added)).
Under UCC section 1-201(30), applicable to Revised Article 9 through Revised section 9-102(c),
"person"-the term used in Article 4-is broader than "organization"-the term used in
Revised Article 9.
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cognate term "account" in Article 4. 48 It focuses on the debtor-

creditor nature of the relationship between a bank and its customer
through its incorporation of the general term "account," which
although under Revised Article 9 does not include "deposit
account, '49 generally means "a right to payment of a monetary

obligation, whether or not earned by performance. "' 5 0

The initial focus then will be whether a bank owes a "right of
payment" to its customer. Generally, this type of obligation will be

found in Article 4, but other similar obligations may arise under
federal banking law. Once such a "right to payment" exists, however,

it will constitute a deposit account only to the extent that it is similar
to "a demand, time, savings, passbook [account]."'" In questionable
cases, therefore, the inquiry will be into the particular practices in the
banking industry.
The definition's specific exclusion of "investment property" and

"accounts evidenced by an instrument" is designed to cope with
common situations. Cash management accounts held by brokers, for

example, may look like checking accounts, since they give individuals
checks that can be used to draw on balances maintained with the

broker, but they are instead investment property under Revised
Article 9.52 As such, they are excluded from the definition of "deposit
account."53 Similarly, the status of the certificate of deposit caused
some trouble under Former Article 9, especially the nonnegotiable or
uncertificated certificate of deposit. 4 Under Revised Article 9, unless
48. Under Article 4, an "account" is defined as "any deposit or credit account with a bank,
including a demand, time, savings, passbook, share draft, or like account, other than an account
evidenced by a certificate of deposit." U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(1).
49. See R. § 9-102(a)(2).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 9-102(a)(29).
52. This is confirmed by the comments: "Thus, the term also does not include shares in a
money-market mutual fund, even if the shares are redeemable by check." Id. § 9-102 cmt. 12.
53. The definition of "investment property" is essentially the same in Revised Article 9 as
it was under the 1995 version of Article 9. Compare U.C.C. § 9-115(1)(f) with R. § 9-102(a)(49).
54. The problem is that certificates of deposit are capable of three different classifications,
each of which has different (and operationally inconsistent) methods of perfection. Compare
Bank IV Topeka, N.A., v. Topeka Bank & Trust Co., 807 P.2d 686, 691 (Ka. Ct. App. 1991)
(nonnegotiable certificate of deposit outside of Article 9 and must be perfected under common
law) with In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 178 B.R. 34, 39 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (bank tried to
perfect interest in nonnegotiable certificate of deposit under common law; court finds certificate
of deposit a general intangible within Article 9 and only way to perfect is to file financing
statement); Drabkin v. Capital Bank, N.A. (In re Latin Inv. Corp.), 156 B.R. 102, 109-10 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1993) (nonnegotiable certificate of deposit is an instrument under Article 9 and must be
perfected by possession); and Cadle Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 490 S.E.2d 334, 338-40 (W. Va.
1997) (same).
The problem was noted as early as 1981. See Steven L. Harris, Non-Negotiable Certificates
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such an account qualifies as an instrument,5 5 it will be treated as a
56
deposit account, thus clarifying this area of the law.

The difference in treatment will be seen later but essentially boils

down to differences in the effective methods of perfection. Under
Revised Article 9, a secured party may file to perfect its security

interest in investment property or in an instrument; 7 however, filing
is completely irrelevant to perfecting a security interest in a deposit
account. 58
2. As Original Collateral in Non-Consumer Secured Transactions-

Revised Section 9-109(d)(13)
Section 9-109 of Revised Article 9 is broad in scope. It states
that, with specific exceptions, Revised Article 9 applies to "a
transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in
personal property or fixtures by contract."5 9 Thus, to the extent that a

deposit account is "personal property," it is presumptively within
Revised Article 9's coverage. 60 This is confirmed by the comments:
of Deposit: An Article 9 Problem, 29 UCLA L. REV. 330 (1981). At least one state changed its
definition of deposit account to exclude only negotiable, as opposed to all, certificates of
deposit. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:9-105(1)(e) (1993).
55. Revised Article 9 does not substantially change the definition of "instrument" from
that found in Current Article 9. Compare Revised section 9-102(a)(47):
"Instrument" means a negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right
to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and
is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any
necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include (i) investment
property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a right to payment arising
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the
card;
with UCC section 9-105(1)(i):
"Instrument" means a negotiable instrument (defined in Section 3-104), or any other
writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security
agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred
by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include
investment property.
56. This again is confirmed by the comments:
The revised definition clarifies the proper treatment of nonnegotiable or uncertificated
certificates of deposit. Under the definition, an uncertificated certificate of deposit
would be a deposit account (assuming there is no writing evidencing the bank's
obligation to pay) whereas a nonnegotiable certificate of deposit would be a deposit
account only if it is not an "instrument" as defined in this section (a question that turns
on whether the nonnegotiable certificate of deposit is "of a type that in ordinary course
of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.")
R. § 9-102 cmt. 12.
57. See id. § 9-312(a).
58. See id. § 9-312(b)(1) ("[A] security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only
by control under Section 9-314 . .
59. Id. § 9-109(a)(1).
60. See Duncan Box & Lumber Co. v. Applied Energies, Inc., 270 S.E.2d 140, 145-46 (W.
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"Deposit accounts may be taken as original collateral under this
Article."'" The consequence of this inclusion is that deposit accounts
may be used as original collateral, without the need to ensure that
they constitute, in some way, proceeds of other Article 9 collateral.
An asset-based lender, for example, may now confidently include
deposit accounts in its security agreement and, to the extent it takes
the required steps to perfect, may count that asset as part of its
collateral.
There is one exception and it is significant. Section 9-109(d)(13)
contains a specific exclusion for certain types of deposit accounts held
by consumers. It states that Revised Article 9 does not extend to "an
assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction. '62 The
import of this exclusion is simply to remove one class of deposit
accounts-those arising in a "consumer transaction" - from Article
9's coverage of original collateral. The exclusion does not change
existing law with respect to coverage of consumer deposit accounts to
the extent that they constitute "proceeds" of other Article 9
collateral, or to the extent that a secured party employs non-Article 9
63
methods to encumber the account.
"Consumer transaction," in turn, is also defined. Under section
9-102(a)(26), a consumer transaction is defined as
a transaction in which (i) an individual incurs an obligation
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, (ii) a security
interest secures the obligation, and (iii) the collateral is held or
acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The
term includes consumer-goods transactions. 64
Va. 1980), for a discussion of the status of a deposit account as personal property outside of
Article 9. See also Cartwright v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 675 So. 2d 847, 847 (Miss. 1996)
("[F]unds on deposit are in the nature of intangible property and therefore subject to
garnishment.").
61. R. § 9-109 cmt. 16.
62. Id. § 9-109(d)(13).
63. See U.C.C. § 9-104(l); R. § 9-109(d)(13).
Although Revised Article 9 excludes certain consumer deposit accounts, this exclusion is
not preemptive; a lender may still attempt to obtain a security interest under other, non-UCC
law. See id. § 9-109 cmt. 16.
64. R. § 9-102(a)(26). A "consumer-goods transaction" is defined in Revised section
9-102(a)(24) as "a consumer transaction in which: (A) an individual incurs an obligation
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; and (B) a security interest in consumer
goods secures the obligation." To complete the cycle, "consumer goods" are defined in Revised
section 9-102(a)(23) as "goods that are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes."
The main difference between a "consumer transaction" and a "consumer-goods
transaction" would appear to be that a "consumer transaction" need not involve a security
interest in consumer goods; some other classification of collateral could be involved. That
distinction is critical for deposit accounts since they are not "goods" and, thus, would not qualify

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:963

Note that the three elements of this definition are conjunctive; all
three have to be present for exclusion of the deposit account. As a
consequence, if a sole proprietor grants an interest in her personal
deposit account to secure her business line of credit, the fact that the
personal account was held primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes would not matter; the lender's security interest
would attach to the deposit account since the obligation secured-the

business line of credit-was not incurred primarily (or at all) for
personal, family, or household purposes.
3. As Proceeds-Revised Section 9-109
To the extent that a deposit account represents or contains

"proceeds" of nondeposit account collateral, those proceeds are
covered by Revised Article 9 regardless of whether a consumer
transaction is involved. Revised section 9-109(d)(13) specifically

states that even in a consumer transaction "Sections 9-315 and 9-322
apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds." 65
This broad coverage as to proceeds, however, assumes that the
deposit account can be seen as "proceeds." Under Revised Article 9,
proceeds include "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other disposition of collateral" and "whatever is
collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral." 66 Moreover,
proceeds do not stop at the first transformation; proceeds of proceeds
'67
continue to be included in the general concept of "proceeds.
As a consequence, when collateral is sold, the money or checks
received by the seller are proceeds and, when they are delivered to a
bank for deposit in a deposit account, that deposit account also
as "consumer goods." Therefore, a transaction involving the grant of a security interest in a
deposit account could never be a "consumer-goods transaction."
65. Id. § 9-109(d)(13).
66. Id. § 9-102(a)(64)(A)-(B). The full definition is as follows:
(64) "Proceeds" means the following property:
(A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other
disposition of collateral;
(B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral;
(C) rights arising out of collateral;
(D) to the extent of the value of collateral, claims arising out of the loss,
nonconformity, or interference with the use of, defects or infringement of
rights in, or damage to, the collateral; or
(E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the extent payable to the debtor
or the secured party, insurance payable by reason of the loss or
nonconformity of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the
collateral.
67. See id. §§ 9-203(f), 9-315(a)(2).
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becomes proceeds of the original secured party's security interest. But

to what extent? If a debtor has $100,000 of unencumbered balances
on deposit and then deposits a $100 check representing the sale of
collateral, how does one divide the indivisible obligation the bank
holds to pay out funds on demand?

The common law (and the equity courts) faced this issue in other
contexts and developed tracing rules. 68 These rules created
presumptions as to which part of the account balance belonged to the

holder of the account and which part did not. Although somewhat
result-oriented towards nonholder claimants (as they were typically

the victims of fraud or worse), these rules were picked up by courts
interpreting Article 9 and applied to divvy up a deposit account under

Article 9.69
Revised Article 9 does not disturb the common law in this
respect. It states that proceeds include deposit accounts "to the extent

that the secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing,
including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under
law other than this article with respect to commingled property of the

type involved."70 As the comments indicate, "[t]he

'equitable

principles'... may [include] the 'lowest intermediate balance rule."'7 '
The "lowest intermediate balance rule," apparently adopted by a
majority of jurisdictions, does yield clear results if the facts are clear.72
Yet by leaving the common law undisturbed, this section permits, and
indeed encourages, variances to develop among the states, depending
on the maturity and availability of such other law.73

68. See supra note 29. For a good description of the adoption of equitable tracing rules into
the mainstream of commercial law, see Barnes, supra note 27, at 292-306.
69. See Barnes, supra note 27, at 296-306. For several cases using section 1-103 to justify
adoption of such equitable principles, see Ex ParteAlabama Mobile Homes, Inc., 468 So. 2d 156,
159-60 (Ala. 1985); and C&H Farm Service v. FarmersSavings Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866, 877 (Iowa
1989).
70. R. § 9-315(b)(2).
71. Id. § 9-315 cmt. 3.
72. See authorities cited supra note 29. Many courts have also placed the burden of tracing
on the secured party. See, e.g., In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club, Inc., 205 B.R. 407, 411
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1997); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 41-42
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993); C.O. Funk & Son, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 415 N.E.2d 1308, 1314-15
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
73. See infra Part IV.E.
Revised Article 9 eliminates Former UCC section 9-306(4), which attempted to deal with
priority to proceeds of a deposit account differently upon the commencement of an insolvency
proceeding. Wisely bowing to possible federal preemption claims, the comments indicate that
under Revised Article 9 "the debtor's entering into bankruptcy does not affect a secured party's
right to proceeds." R. § 9-315 cmt. 8.
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4. Choice of Law-Revised Section 9-304
Not all states will adopt Revised Article 9 at the same time.
Moreover, as indicated in the last section, Revised Article 9
anticipates that the non-UCC law of states will factor into whether a
deposit account consists of identifiable proceeds. For these reasons,
and possibly others, 74 it will be important to know which state's law
governs attachment and perfection of interests in deposit accounts.
In response, the drafters have added a special section on choice
of law for deposit accounts. Revised section 9-304(a) states that "[t]he
local law of a bank's jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of
perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a
deposit account maintained with that bank."75 This adopts a rule that
is easy to apply: simply look to the jurisdiction of the bank holding
the deposit account and apply that local law.
In most cases, this will likely be enough direction to settle
disputes. To avoid disputes, however, most banks will look to the
remaining provisions of Revised section 9-304, which provides a
waterfall of options. The first option is the one that will likely be used
most: "If an agreement between the bank and the debtor governing
the deposit account expressly provides that a particular jurisdiction is
the bank's jurisdiction for purposes of this part, this article, or [the
Uniform Commercial Code], that jurisdiction is the bank's
jurisdiction. ' '76 This provides maximum party autonomy and is to take
preference over the UCC's general choice of law validator, that of a
"reasonable relationship. ' 77 This is the intended result, as the
comments make clear: "The parties' choice is effective, even if the
jurisdiction whose law is chosen bears no relationship to the parties or
the transaction. 7 8 This party autonomy is also flexible; it "permits the
parties to choose the law of one jurisdiction to govern perfection and
priority of security interests and a different governing law for other
' 79
purposes.
If the parties do not choose a jurisdiction in their agreement,
"

74. It may also be the case that parties in international transactions with non-U.S. debtors
will use domestic United States deposit accounts as collateral. This could be the case, for
example, in international project finance or securitization. A pointer to the law applicable to the
deposit account is useful helpful in these cases as well.
75. R. § 9-304(a).
76. Id. § 9-304(b)(1).
77. U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
78. R. § 9-304 cmt. 2.
79. Id.
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Revised section 9-304 provides an exhaustive list of pointers. If the
UCC is not referred to in an agreement between the bank and the
debtor, then any other choice of law clause between the bank and its
customer (which need not be the debtor 8° ) suffices as a locator of the
law of the bank's jurisdiction.8 1 If there is no choice of law clause in
the agreement between the bank and its customer, then one looks to
any designation as to where the bank will maintain the deposit
account, 82 and if that does not produce a state, then to the
specification of the office servicing the account contained in any bank
statements related to the account.83 Finally, if all else fails, one looks
84
to the location of the bank's chief executive office.
B. Attachment- Revised Section 9-203
Under both Current and Revised Article 9, a security interest
must "attach" to be enforceable against the debtor. Under Current
Article 9, attachment consists of three basic elements: the debtor's
having an interest in the collateral; value having been given; and
either possession of the collateral by the secured party pursuant to an
agreement or a written security agreement in which the collateral is
adequately described. 85 Security interests in identifiable proceeds are
automatic.86 Revised Article 9 carries this treatment over to deposit
accounts fairly intact.
1. Original Collateral-Revised Section 9-203(b)
For a security interest to attach to a deposit account as original
collateral, Revised Article 9 requires the debtor to have an interest in
the collateral and value to have been given.87 The third requirement80. For some forms of perfection, especially with "blocked" accounts, the secured party
may wish to become the bank's customer as this will enable it to have priority over the bank
holding the deposit account. See id. § 9-327(4).
81. See id. § 9-304(b)(2).
82. See id. § 9-304(b)(3).
83. See id. § 9-304(b)(4).
84. See id. § 9-304(b)(5).
85. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1).
86. See id. § 9-203(3).
87. See R. § 9-203(b)(1)-(2). A debtor's rights need not be absolute and exclusive, thus
allowing banks to take interests in joint deposit accounts. See Comment 6 to Revised 9-203,
which provides:
A debtor's limited rights in collateral, short of full ownership, are sufficient for a
security interest to attach. However, in accordance with basic personal property
conveyancing principles, the baseline rule is that a security interest attaches only to
whatever rights a debtor may have, broad or limited as those rights may be.
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possession or a written security agreement-has been modified to
conform to the nature of deposit account collateral. 88
This modification provides that, with respect to deposit accounts,
the third element of attachment is satisfied if "the secured party has
control under Section 9-104 ...pursuant to the debtor's security

agreement."8 9 Control will be examined later, 90 but it is interesting to
note that the incorporated definition-security agreement-does not
require a writing. A security agreement is simply "an agreement that
creates or provides for a security interest." 91 The definition of
"agreement" in Article 1-applicable to Revised Article 992 -simply
refers to "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language

or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance."' 93 Thus,
attachment (at least with respect to deposit accounts) has no signed
writing requirement. 94 As a consequence, a security interest in favor
of a bank in a deposit account can arise by implication as well as by
express oral agreement 9 - a fact that third party creditors will have to
face each time they seek to garnish a deposit account.
2. Proceeds-Revised Sections 9-302(f) and 9-315(a)(2)

As before, attachment of a security interest in proceeds of
collateral is automatic if the security interest attached in the original
collateral. 96 Revised section 9-302(f), however, states that the
88. See id. § 9-203(b)(3).
89. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(D). This section also applies to security interests in electronic chattel
paper, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights. See id.
90. See infra Part IV.G.
91. R. § 9-102(a)(73).
92. See id. § 9-102(c).

93. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
94. Revised Article 9 also does not require a specific description of the deposit account by
identifying number. Deposit accounts are subject to the general rule of Revised section 9-108,
which states that a sufficient description need only "reasonably identif[y] what is described." See
R. § 9-108(a). Thus, a generic description of "all deposit accounts" should cover all accounts,
especially since Revised Article 9 validates the parties' choice of defined types of collateral. See
id. § 9-108(b)(3). Indeed, the comments indicate that, at least in the security agreement, use of
the term "deposit account" or something which similarly describes the banking relationship, will
be necessary. See id. § 9-109 cmt. 16.
95. This result is recognized in the comments to Revised section 9-104 which describe the
consequences of control: "'[C]ontrol ...pursuant to the debtor's agreement' may substitute for
an authenticated security agreement as an element of attachment." Id. § 9-104 cmt. 2. Since
control can exist simply by the bank's maintenance of the deposit account, see id. § 9-104(a)(1),
there is no necessity (as opposed to prudence) of a writing for a security interest to attach.
96. See id. § 9-203(f) ("The attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the secured
party the rights to proceeds provided by Section 9-315 ....
").
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attachment is only to the extent provided by Revised section 9-315. 97
Revised section 9-315 carries over the requirement that "a security
interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral." 98 As
indicated above, 99 whether a deposit account contains "identifiable"
proceeds will be a question answered by "method[s] of tracing,
including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under
law other than this article with respect to commingled property of the
type involved." 1°°
C. Perfection
Perfection is one of the essential goals of a secured party. Under
current law, a perfected security interest is senior to a judicial lien
creditor and, to the extent a bankruptcy trustee has a lien creditor's
status, 101 is immune in bankruptcy.12 Broadly speaking, whereas
attachment makes a security interest good as against the debtor,
perfection makes it good as against the world. Much of the debate
regarding inclusion of deposit accounts in Revised Article 9 centered
on the method of perfection that would be chosen. California and
other states which had nonuniform inclusion of deposit accounts
under existing Article 9 relied typically on a combination of
automatic perfection (if the secured party was the bank maintaining
the deposit account) and nonpublic notice to the bank holding the
account (if the secured party was not the bank holding the account).103
In the early stages of the Revised Article 9 project, proposals
floated which would have made perfection in a deposit account, at
least by nondepositary banks, dependent on filing. °4 This proposal
lost, and Revised Article 9 essentially directs inquiring creditors not
to a public registry but to the bank maintaining the account.

97. See id.
98. Id. § 9-315(a)(2) (emphasis added).
99. See supra Part II.A.3.
100. R. § 9-315(b)(2).
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994).
102. See U.C.C. § 9-301(4).
103. See, e.g., CAL. COMM. CODE § 9302(1)(g) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 490:9-302(1)(h) (1993 & Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 28-9-302(1)6) (Supp. 1998); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10:9-305(4) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
Illinois requires the secured party to acknowledge and consent to the notice. See 810 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/9-302(1)(i) (West 1997).
104. See PEB STUDY, supra note 16, at 70.
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1. Original Collateral-Control and Revised Sections 9-312(b) and
9-314
With respect to deposit accounts as original collateral, Revised
Article 9 is clear: "[A] security interest in a deposit account may be
perfected only by control under Section 9-314." 101 Revised section
9-314, in turn, simply contains a reference to the definition of control
for deposit accounts. 1°6
What is "control"? It is a concept borrowed from Article 8 on
investment securities. 107 Article 8 developed the concept to
accommodate the ways in which securities are purchased and
encumbered without the need for direct possession. 1 8 Under Article
8, "[t]he key to the control concept is that the purchaser has the
present ability to have the securities sold or transferred without
further action by the transferor. 1°9 Since 1994, this concept of control
has been part of Article 9 with respect to investment property, which
includes securities and security entitlements. 110
Revised Article 9 retains the control concept for investment
property"' and adapts it and applies it to deposit accounts as well." 2
In this respect, Revised Article 9 treats the deposit account less like a
specialized receivable and more like a security, less like an intangible
asset without a fixed locus and more like a tangible asset located at
the bank holding the deposit. With the concept of control in place,
Revised Article 9 then lists three methods by which a secured party
may obtain the necessary control. 3
a. Automatic Control by MaintainingDeposit Account-Revised
Section 9-104(a)(1)
The first and easiest method of control is by simply maintaining
the deposit account. Revised Article 9 states that "[a] secured party
105. R. § 9-312(b)(1) (emphasis added); see id. § 9-104 cmt. 2 ("[W]hen a deposit account is
taken as original collateral, the only method of perfection is obtaining control under this
section.").
106. See id. § 9-314(a).
107. See id. § 9-104 cmts. 1, 3.
108. See U.C.C. § 8-106 cmt. 7 ("A principal purpose of the 'control' concept is to eliminate
the uncertainty and confusion that results from attempting to apply common law possession
concepts to modern securities holding practices.").
109. Id.
110. See U.C.C. § 9-115(1)(f).
111. SeeR.§9-106.
112. See id. § 9-104(a).
113. See id.
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has control of a deposit account if: (1) the secured party is the bank
with which the deposit account is maintained. ' 114 Since attachment
can occur without a written agreement, this essentially means that
creditors must always assume that a bank has a security interest in all
of its customers' commercial deposit accounts. Revised Article 9 is
explicit on this point: "[a]ll actual and potential creditors of the
debtor are always on notice that the bank with which the debtor's
deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the deposit

account." 115

b. Control by Agreement-Revised Section 9-104(a)(2)

A second method to obtain control is of interest to non-bank
secured parties such as asset-based lenders. Under this method, a

secured party obtains control if "the debtor, secured party, and bank
have agreed in an authenticated record that the bank will comply with
instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of
the funds in the account without further consent by the debtor. ' 116
There are several elements of this type of control. First, the use
of the verb "agreed" presupposes an agreement, which should
incorporate the Article 1 definition of a "bargain in fact.""' 7 Next, that

agreement must be contained in an "authenticated record."118
The main component of this form of control, however, is the last
element. The bank maintaining the deposit account must agree to
"comply with instructions originated by the secured party directing
disposition of the funds in the account without further consent by the
debtor." 1 9 The key here is the lack of any future consent by the
114. Id. § 9-104(a)(1).
115. Id. § 9-104 cmt. 3.
116. Id. § 9-104(a)(2). A proposed form of control agreement, originally drafted by and
reprinted with the consent of Edwin Smith, Esq., of Bingham Dana, appears as an Appendix to
this article.
117. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
118. See R. § 9-104(a)(2). The cognate term under existing Article 9 would be a "signed
writing." See id. § 9-102 cmts. 9a, 9b. A "record" is defined as "information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form." Id. § 9-102(a)(69). Revised Article 9 intends that this definition be medianeutral; that is, it is pliable enough to apply to both traditional paper transactions and modem
electronic ones. See id. § 9-102 cmt. 9a. "Authenticate" takes the place of and expands on the
concept of "signing." Thus to "authenticate" a writing is "to sign" or "to execute or otherwise
adopt a symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a record in whole or in part, with the present
intent of the authenticating person to identify the person and adopt or accept a record." Id.
§ 9-102(a)(7). This definition, thus, picks up not only traditional manual signing with a pen and
paper, but also any process by which the party acting identifies himself and accepts the writing
as his. Thus, many digital signature regimes will be brought into Revised Article 9.
119. Id. § 9-104(a)(2).
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debtor; 120 under Revised Article 9, the inability of the debtor to
countermand the secured party's actions gives the secured party the
control necessary to put others on notice of its interest. Thus, the
secured party will have control of any disposition, even if such a
disposition is not commercially reasonable or if other documentation
between the debtor and the secured party does not give the secured
party the right to take the proceeds. In short, control is linked to the
power, as opposed to the right, to direct disposition. 121 As a
consequence, a bank need not listen to a debtor who correctly asserts
that an order from the secured party to dispose of funds on deposit is
not authorized by other agreements. In the securities area, some have
drafted their control agreements to obtain in advance the debtor's
consent to any such action so as to allay any concerns by those
1 22
holding the securities.
An alternative to such a situation is to place conditions on the
secured party's future directive, such as requiring a certificate that the
debtor is in default. The comments indicate that this type of condition
will not vitiate control, so long as the debtor has no ability to rescind
the secured party's authority. 123
c. Control by Becoming Bank's Customer-Revised Section
9-104(a)(3)

The final method for obtaining control is for the "secured party
[to] become[] the bank's customer with respect to the deposit
account. ' 124 As Revised section 9-102(b) indicates, the use of
"customer" in this context means the same as it does in Article 4: "a
person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed
to collect items, including a bank that maintains an account at another
120. Cf id. § 9-104 cmt. 3 ("Of course, if the condition [to the secured party's giving any
order regarding disposition] is the debtor's further consent, the statute explicitly provides that
the agreement would not confer control.").
121. As a consequence, a secured party might still be liable for the consequences of a
commercially unreasonable disposition or might be enjoined in appropriate cases. See id.
§ 9-625(a).
122. See, e.g., Edwin E. Smith, The Emerged and Emerging New Uniform Commercial Code:
Sample Form of Revised UCC Articles 8 and 9 Securities Account "Control Agreement", SC36
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 63 (1997); see also R. § 8-106 cmt. 7 (suggesting that any similar control
agreement provide that the conditions are effective only between secured party and debtor and
not as between secured party and securities intermediary).
123. See R. § 9-104 cmt. 3 ("An agreement to comply with the secured party's instructions
suffices for 'control' of a deposit account under this section even if the bank's agreement is
subject to specified conditions, e.g., that the secured party's instructions are accompanied by a
certification that the debtor is in default.").
124. Id. § 9-104(a)(3).
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bank."' 12 Thus, the secured party becomes a person in privity with the
bank maintaining the account and, as the comments make clear,
"would enjoy the right ... to withdraw funds from ... the deposit
account."126
By use of the definite article "the," the text would seem to
indicate that the secured party could be the only customer with
respect to the deposit account, but this is not crystal clear.121 One way
in which the secured party could achieve customer status would be to

have the bank maintaining the account place the account in the
secured party's name. 12 This may create problems, however, in terms
of the debtor's access to the account, unless the debtor is added as an

additional signatory to the account (with likely limits on the amount
of checks authorized
which has significant
used for operating
containing funds the

under its signature).129 This method of control,
benefits in priority contests, 30 will likely not be
accounts, but rather for blocked accounts
debtor does not intend to use in its everyday

business affairs.
2. Deposit Accounts as Proceeds of Other Collateral- Revised

Section 9-315
Revised Article 9 carries forward the current rule that perfection
in the original collateral suffices for perfection in the proceeds,' at
least for twenty days. 32 On the twenty-first day after the security
interest attaches in the proceeds, the security interest becomes
unperfected unless, among other things, the proceeds are
indentifiable cash proceeds. 33 Since deposit accounts are "cash
proceeds,' 134 the primary issue with proceeds will be, as previously
125. U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(5).
126. R. § 9-104 cmt. 3.
127. Revised section 9-104(b) seems to indicate that it need not be. That section states that
"[a] secured party that has satisfied subsection (a) has control, even if the debtor retains the
right to direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account." Id. § 9-104(b). The comments
emphasize this point. See id. § 9-104 cmt. 3 ("[Slubsection (b) makes clear that the debtor's
ability to reach the funds is not inconsistent with 'control.').
128. See id. § 9-327 cmt. 4.
129. Setting up the account in this manner also raises questions as to how the bank
maintaining the account will report any interest accrued and as to the manner as to which the
secured party will credit any deposits by the debtor into the account. See infra Part IV.G.
130. See infra Part II.D.1.
131. See R. § 9-315(c) ("A security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the
security interest in the original collateral was perfected.").
132. See id. § 9-315(e).
133. See id. § 9-315(d)(2).
134. See id. § 9-102(a)(9) ("'Cash proceeds' means proceeds that are money, checks, deposit
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indicated,'135 one of identifying, through appropriate means of tracing,
the portion of the deposit account allocable to the secured party's
proceeds claim.
D. Priority-RevisedSection 9-327
The goal of attachment and perfection is priority over creditors,
purchasers, and the bankruptcy trustee. If the creditor obtains first
priority, it also obtains the ability to control the liquidation process
from and after default.
Under existing Article 9, priority over nonconsensual liens,
purchasers, and the bankruptcy trustee is established by prior
perfection, regardless of whether perfection occurs a year or a
nanosecond before the nonconsensual creditor obtains its lien. 13 6 As
to other creditors claiming an Article 9 security interest, priority is
established by a first-in-time system; the creditor who first perfects or
files its financing statement has priority over other consensual
37
creditors as to the collateral and its proceeds.
Revised Article 9 substantially preserves the priorities in Current
Article 9 with respect to priority contests between secured parties
with proceeds only. The rules change significantly, however, when
one of the priority claimants asserts that its security interest in the
deposit account was taken as original collateral; that is, when it is
specified and properly described in the security agreement between
the secured party and the debtor.
1. Security Interest in Deposit Account That Is Claimed Only as
Original Collateral: Creditor with Control Wins Regardless of
Timing-Revised Section 9-327(1)
In most cases of priority conflict involving claims to deposit
accounts as original collateral, only one secured party will be in
control of the account within the meaning of Revised section 9-104.138
Not surprisingly, the secured party in control will prevail. Under

accounts, or the like.").
135. See supra Part II.A.3 on the importance of tracing in obtaining identifiable cash
proceeds.
136. See U.C.C. § 9-301(4); see also id. § 9-301(1)(b).
137. See id. §§ 9-312(5) (as to original collateral), 9-312(6) (as to proceeds).
138. These cases could arise if a secured party who has a proceeds claim is unable to trace
and identify proceeds and, thus, would not have a proceeds claim, but whose security agreement
includes a security interest in deposit accounts.
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Revised Article 9, this is explicit by statute,'3 9 although the same
result would be obtained under the general principle that a perfected

security interest-the one held by the secured party in control-has
priority over an unperfected security interest-the one held by the
secured party who is not in control. 14° This result is obtained

regardless of when the various security interests attached. Put another
way, the rule of priority for deposit accounts is not based on temporal
priority, but rather is based upon the ability to exercise dominion.
What if more than one secured party has control? This could

occur if, for example, a debtor in a workout situation granted two
groups of creditors security interests in its deposit accounts, with one
group agreeing to be junior to the other. The parties may of course
agree to subordinate whatever interest they have to the allocation

they have agreed upon themselves. 141 If there is no agreement,
priority will rank "according to priority in time of obtaining
42

control."1
The exception is, of course, with respect to the bank maintaining
the deposit account. Unless there is a subordination agreement with
that bank, it will prevail automatically over all other security interests
in the deposit account. 143 The only other way a secured party may
prevail over the depositary bank is by obtaining control through
becoming the bank's customer.' 44 In that event, the secured party
145
defeats the bank's security interest.
2. Security Interests in Deposit Accounts Which Are Each Claimed as
Proceeds Only
If no party has taken a security interest in the deposit account as
original collateral, then the rules regarding priority change, but are
139. See R. § 9-327(1).
140. The general principle is stated in Revised section 9-322(a)(2). With deposit accounts as
collateral, however, perfection as to original collateral can only be by "control." See id.
§ 9-312(b)(1); see also supra Part II.C.1. As a consequence, a secured party who does not have
control is also unperfected, at least to the extent the claim is one to the deposit account as
original collateral.
141. See R. § 9-339. If the secured party maintaining the deposit account is also an indenture
trustee on an outstanding issue of securities subject to the Trust Indenture Act, the sharing
might be mandatory. See Trust Indenture Act § 311(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk(a) (1994).
142. R. § 9-327(2).
143. See id. § 9-327(3). By becoming the bank's customer, the secured party also becomes
senior to any setoff or recoupment right the depositary bank may have against the debtor. See
id. § 9-340(c).
144. See id. § 9-104(a)(3).
145. See id. § 9-327(4).
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basically the same as under Current Article 9. First, of course, the
secured creditor must have some claim to the account. Revised
Article 9 allocates claims to proceeds in deposit accounts according to
non-Article 9 tracing rules. 146 That is, if the secured party is able to
"identif[y] the proceeds by a method of tracing, including application
of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than this
article,' ' 47 then its claim to proceeds attaches, and its right to that
portion of the deposit account so identified is superior to the debtor's.
As to competing security interests which also can trace their
proceeds into the deposit account, Revised Article 9 continues the
current general rules. So long as the proceeds are deemed part of the
deposit account, they will be perfected. 148 With a perfected security
interest in at least part of the deposit account, the secured party will
defeat any involuntary lien creditor (or garnishor) as to that part.149
As between two competing consensual security interests, Revised
Article 9 continues the "first-in-time" rule; 15 0 the secured creditor who
filed or perfected first with respect to its original collateral has the
same priority as to the proceeds and defeats the secured creditor who
filed later. This is the case even if the later-filing creditor's collateral
description better matches the form of the collateral at the time of the
dispute. As a consequence, Revised Article 9 allocates priority
between two secured creditors in these cases by referring to the first
date upon which one of the secured parties was perfected or filed its
financing statement as to its original collateral. As an example, as
between an inventory financier and a factor financing accounts arising
from such inventory, the secured party who filed its financing
statement (as to inventory or accounts) will have priority over
proceeds existing in the deposit account.

146. Revised section 9-315(b)(2) provides:
Proceeds [that are not goods] that are commingled with other property are identifiable
proceeds.., to the extent that the secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of
tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other
than this article with respect to commingled property of the type involved.
147. R. § 9-315(b)(2).
148. See id. § 9-315(d)(2).
149. See id. § 9-317(a)(2).
150. See id. § 9-322(a)(1). Under Revised Article 9, as under Current Article 9, the
perfection date for proceeds is the date of filing or other perfection for the original collateral.
See id. § 9-322(b)(1).
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3. When Security Interest in Deposit Account Is Claimed Both as
Original Collateral and as Proceeds: "Control" Is King-Revised
Sections 9-104, 9-327, and 9-322(f)
If a secured party claims the deposit account as proceeds and
another secured party claims the deposit account as original
collateral, the result is simple and potentially harsh: the person in
control of the deposit account wins. This follows from the rules
applicable to deposit accounts: "A security interest held by a secured
party having control of the deposit account under Section 9-104 has
priority over a conflicting security interest held by a secured party
' Control is, thus, the sole determinant.
that does not have control."151
E. Proceedsof Deposit Accounts
In the normal course of commerce, funds will flow into and out
of deposit accounts. And since deposit accounts are typically media
through which financial transactions are carried out, the question of
rights to proceeds from a deposit account will be critical.
As an initial matter, recall that a security interest continues in
collateral unless a provision of Article 9 terminates it or unless the
secured party authorizes the termination. 1 2 Recall also that proceeds
are defined generically as anything received on the exchange or
disposition of collateral. 153 Thus, in any transaction, there is a
presumption that the security interest "sticks" to the collateral
regardless of the change of ownership and also adheres to whatever
the transferor received in exchange for the transfer.
Revised Article 9 has two very different treatments of these
interests. For purposes of reference, I use the term "continuation
proceeds" to refer to the continued interest in funds or cash paid by
the depositary bank pursuant to its deposit account agreement. 54 In
contrast, I use the term "exchanged proceeds" to refer to what the
transferor receives for causing the bank to part with the funds
pursuant to the deposit account agreement.

151. Id. § 9-327(1).
152. See id. § 9 -315(a)(1).
153. See id. § 9 -102(a)(64).
154. Technically, these are not proceeds but a portion of the original collateral upon which a
security interest is still attached. Given the intangible nature of the collateral and the fact that it
is "original" only by convention, I have tried to keep parallel terms.
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1. Continuation "Proceeds": Cash or Funds Paid Out-Revised
Section 9-322
Under Current Article 9, one almost has to take on faith that
funds paid out of a deposit account in the ordinary course-as by
check or other order-are free of the secured party's proceeds claim.
Nothing in the statute expressly dictates this result, and the most the
current statute musters is a comment that "[w]here cash proceeds are
covered into the debtor's checking account and paid out in the
operation of the debtor's business, recipients of the funds of course
take free of any claim which the secured party may have in them as
proceeds."' 55 The comment then restricts this claim to ordinary course
transactions, leaving all unusual transactions to the realm of
15 6
fraudulent transfer law.
Particularly with the addition of deposit accounts as original
collateral in business transactions, more was needed.'57 Revised
Article 9's response is in section 9-322. It provides that a person takes
cash (such as might be paid out over the counter) or funds (such as
might be paid through the check clearing system) free of the security
interest in the deposit account "unless the transferee acts in collusion
158
with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party."'
This places a high hurdle on the secured party wishing to pursue
a cash or funds recipient, which is intentional. The comments indicate
that this standard was borrowed from Article 8 and it adopts "the
most protective (i.e., least stringent) of the various standards now
found in the UCC.' ' 59 Reading the statute in this light, it appears that
not only is collusion between the debtor and the recipient to be
proved, but the secured party will also need to prove that the
collusion was aimed at violating the secured party's rights. This
derives from the phrase "collusion with the debtor in violating the
rights of the secured party," since this links collusion with the
violation of the secured party's rights. Thus, a swindle or check kite
aimed at bilking others might be a collusive transaction, but unless

155. U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 2c; see ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Bank of the West, 166 F.3d
295, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1999); Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Sovran Bank, N.A., 4 F.3d 1262, 1267-69
(4th Cir. 1993).
156. See U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 2c.
157. See PEB STUDY, supra note 16, at 71,120-22.
158. R. § 9-332(a)-(b) (parallel language used for cash and for funds). This standard does
not apply to a transfer of a deposit account or to the creation of a security interest. See id.
§ 9-332 cmt. 2.
159. Id. § 9-332 cmt. 4.
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the secured party was in the zone of the scheme's victims, Revised
Article 9 will not serve as a predicate for the return of funds.
2. Exchanged Proceeds: What Is Received upon Transfer of Funds
from Deposit Accounts
One can understand the reluctance to allow secured parties to
pursue cash and funds transferred by banks as support for the funds
clearing system. No such interest, however, supports limiting pursuit
of what is received in exchange for the funds, and Revised Article 9
allows secured parties to pursue such collateral.
The rules, however, are quite complicated. The source of this
complication is that secured parties may claim priority under two
different systems: the nontemporal priority system, upon which
priority is based upon control, whenever acquired; and the temporal
system, upon which priority is based on first in time of perfection or
filing. These two systems potentially clash when a debtor acquires
collateral with funds traceable from a deposit account and the
collateral acquired also fits within the security interest of a competing
secured party.
Revised Article 9 mediates these differences based on the form
of the disputed collateral. Essentially, those claiming under
nontemporal methods prevail if the disputed collateral is cash
proceeds or similar collateral; and those claiming under temporal
methods of priority prevail in cases of noncash proceeds. There are
subtle differences, however, involved, requiring a detailed
examination of these provisions.
a. Temporal Priority Claimantsvs. Nontemporal PriorityClaimantsRevised Sections 9-322(d), (e), and (J)
Revised section 9-322(c) begins the analysis. It states a "special
priority rule" which provides that once a secured party has priority
through control, 160 it has the same priority as to certain types of
proceeds. 161 To retain its priority, the secured party's security interest
160. Technically, the statute states that "a security interest in collateral which qualifies for
priority over a conflicting security interest under Section 9-327 ... also has priority over a
conflicting security interest in: . .. proceeds," subject to certain conditions. See id. § 9-322(c).
Section 9-327, the embedded reference, provides priority rules for perfected security interests in
deposit accounts and essentially ranks priority in terms of actual control at the time of the
dispute, rather than by the time the secured party obtained control. See id. § 9-327.
161. See id. § 9-322(c). Technically, the statute applies any time a secured party has nonfiling
priority under section 9-327 (deposit accounts), 9-328 (investment property), 9-329 (letter-ofcredit rights), 9-330 (chattel paper), or 9-331 (certain negotiable instruments or securities
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initially must be perfected,'162 and the collateral claimed as proceeds
must be "cash proceeds or of the same type as the collateral."' 163
Further, if the disputed collateral is proceeds of proceeds, all the
intervening proceeds leading to the disputed collateral must have
been "cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the collateral, or
an account relating to the collateral." 164
(1) When the Disputed Collateral Is Cash Proceeds Without Any
Intervening Noncash Proceeds
Some examples may make this clearer. Assume D has granted a
security interest in deposit accounts to Bank A to secure all
obligations the debtor owes to A. D maintains a deposit account at A
and owes significant sums to A. One day, D uses funds in that deposit
account to purchase a nonnegotiable certificate of deposit from Bank
B. If that certificate of deposit is proceeds of the original deposit
account, then the secured party is perfected in it since it is identifiable
165
cash proceeds.
Assume further that another secured party, SP-2, with a
perfected security interest in, say, inventory only, could have traced
and laid claim to the entire deposit account at Bank A as sales
proceeds of its inventory, and can similarly trace and lay claim to the
Bank B certificate of deposit.
Who has a superior claim to the certificate of deposit? The
answer is Bank A, without the need to know when Bank A's security
interest in the deposit account was created. Bank A had control under
section 9-327 of the deposit account and, thus, had priority before the
purchase. Section 9-322(c) continues that priority as long as Bank A's
interest continues to be perfected (the tracing and identifiability of
the funds ensure that for both parties) and as long as the proceeds are

entitlements under Article 8).
162. See id. § 9-322(c)(2)(A).
163. Id. § 9-322(c)(2)(B).
164. Id. § 9-322(c)(2)(C).
165. If the certificate of deposit were purchased with funds traceable to an encumbered
deposit account, the certificate of deposit should be "proceeds"; the critical question is whether
it is "cash proceeds." See id. § 9-102(a)(9). Under existing law, at least one court has held that
certificates of deposit are not cash proceeds, relying on "common sense" interpretations of
revisions covering certificates of deposit. See Citicorp (USA), Inc. v. Davidson Lumber Co., 718
F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1983). Under Revised Article 9, if the certificate of deposit is not itself a
deposit account (because it is an instrument, for example), the issue of whether it is "cash
proceeds" will depend on whether the certificate of deposit is "functionally equivalent" to a
deposit account See R. § 9-102 cmt 13e.
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"cash proceeds" such as the certificate of deposit.' 66

The result is not changed so long as the "type" conditions
specified in section 9-322(c)(2)(C) are met; that is, so long as "all
intervening proceeds are cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as
the collateral, or an account relating to the collateral."' 6 7 Thus, if the
debtor transferred the certificate of deposit to Carl and took a check

in exchange, the check would be proceeds of proceeds (sometimes
called second-generation proceeds), and Bank A's priority would
continue into Carl's check. 68 The same result would occur if Carl
merely promised to pay for the certificate of deposit and then later
settled his debt with a check. His intervening promise would be an
account 169 related to the collateral, one of the favored types of
collateral for Bank A to continue its priority. Thus Bank A will have

priority over SP-2.
(2) When the Disputed Collateral Is Noncash Proceeds
If, however, D uses funds from the deposit account to acquire

new inventory, the result changes. The reason for this change is that it
is no longer the case that "all intervening proceeds are cash proceeds,

proceeds of the same type as the collateral, or an account relating to
the collateral" as required by the special priority rule of Revised
section 9-322(c)(2).7 ° Revised section 9-322(c) thus does not apply.
If section 9-322(c) does not apply, who has priority? In this case,
SP-2 will likely have priority as to the inventory. This result comes

from Revised section 9-322(d), which applies so long as the disputed
collateral is not "not cash proceeds, chattel paper, negotiable
documents, instruments, investment property, or letter-of-credit

166. Under Revised section 9-102(a)(9), cash proceeds include proceeds that are "money,
checks, deposit accounts, or the like."
This analysis of course ignores the rights, if any, of Bank B since, in the absence of
subordination or a control agreement, any security interest that Bank B holds in the certificate
of deposit would be senior to both Bank A and the inventory lender under section 9-327 (if a
consensual security interest exists) or under section 9-340 (common law setoff).
167. R. § 9-322(c)(2)(C).
168. Its security interest in the certificate of deposit would also continue, and Bank A would
continue to enjoy priority with respect to it as well.
169. An account no longer needs to be related to the provision or promised provision of
goods and services. Under Revised section 9-102(a)(2), it is the broad-based term for any "right
to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property
that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for
services rendered or to be rendered." The substitution of "property" for "goods" (the locution
used in Current Article 9 section 9-106) significantly expands the scope of the term "account."
170. See R. § 9-322(c)(2)(C).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:963

rights."'7 1 Subsection (d) provides that if a security interest in deposit
accounts is perfected initially by a method other than filing,

"conflicting perfected security interests in proceeds of the collateral
17 2
rank according to priority in time of filing.'

Under this filing standard, who has priority? First note that both
A and SP-2 have perfected security interests in the inventory. SP-2's
security agreement and financing statement both list inventory, so its
position is simple to analyze. Bank A, on the other hand, perfected its

security interest in the deposit account by control-a method "other
than filing." That does not destroy its interest in the inventory,
however; as long as it can trace funds from the account into the
inventory, it will have a perfected security interest in the inventory, at
least for twenty days. 7 3 Moreover, so long as it files within this
17 4
twenty-day period, its perfection will continue beyond that period.
Even though perfected, Bank A will likely lose to SP-2 so long as
SP-2's financing statement predates any financing statement filed by

Bank A. Under subsection (d), conflicting security interests "rank
according to priority in time of filing." If the inventory lender filed
before the debtor's acquisition of the inventory-a likely
76
1
occurrence' 7 5-then its security interest will prevail over Bank A.

(3) When the Disputed Collateral Is Cash Proceeds, but There Are
Intervening Noncash Proceeds

What happens if, using the above example in (2), the inventory is
sold and the proceeds again take the form of cash proceeds? Continue
the example above, but now assume that the debtor sells the

inventory for cash and places the funds not in A, but in a new deposit
account at Bank B.177 In this case, subsection (c) will not supply the
rule of priority since there are intervening noncash proceeds; here, it
171. Id. § 9-322(e).
172. Id. § 9-322(d).
173. See id. § 9-315(d). The statute says that the interest becomes unperfected on the 21st
day after attachment, thereby giving 20 days of protection.
174. See id. § 9-315(d)(1).
175. If Bank A had a financing statement on file which predates the inventory lender's, then
the inventory lender presumably could have taken steps to assess the risk such a filing presented
either by obtaining a control or subordination agreement from A. Since it did not, it is not unfair
to allocate the loss to it should the deposit account prove insufficient to satisfy all secured claims
against it.
176. As noted in the comments, "[t]his corresponds with the likely expectations of the
parties." R. § 9-322 cmt. 9, example 12.
177. To reduce complexity, assume that B is unrelated to any other party and that it does
not claim any setoff rights or any security interest in the new deposit account.
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is the inventory. When the inventory is sold, however, and the
proceeds placed in another deposit account, the special rule of
Revised section 9-322(d) ceases to apply, since subsection (e) makes
clear that subsection (d) applies "only if the proceeds of the collateral
are not cash proceeds.' 17 8 Since the inventory blocks the trail of cash
proceeds, Revised section 9-322(d) is no longer available.
In this case, then, since no special priority rule is available, the
general rules of Revised section 9-322(a) and (b) will determine
priority, and they provide that priority tracks "according to ... time
of filing or perfection.' 1 79 It thus becomes imperative in this situation
to know when Bank A first became perfected; that is, when it first
obtained control over the original deposit account. 18° Since both
parties appear to be perfected continuously at all relevant times, a
court will then compare that date of perfection to the date upon
which the inventory lender filed against its collateral to determine
18
ultimate priority. t
b. The Trump Position-When the ProceedsWind Up Back in the
OriginalDeposit Account
The examples above assume that the disputed collateral is no
longer in the same deposit account from which the proceeds claim
arose. What if that assumption is relaxed and the funds wind up back
at Bank A? Bank A, the bank with control over the account, prevails,
again without regard to time of filing. The special priority rules of
subsections (c) and (d) of section 9-322 each contain an exception for
conditions specified in subsection (f). Subsection (f), in turn, states
that the special priority rules are subject to "the other provisions of
this part."' 82 As comment 8 makes clear, "[o]ne of those 'other
provisions' is Section 9-327, which affords priority to a security
interest perfected by control."' 83
As a consequence, regardless of claims to proceeds if the debtor
deposits proceeds back into the original deposit account, the rules of

178. R. § 9-322(e) (emphasis added).
179. Id. § 9-322(a)(1).
180. This assumes that the date of creation of the account will control for all subsequent
deposits, and the initial agreement between the bank and depositor contains a clause granting a
security interest in the account in favor of the depositary bank. At least in bankruptcy, the
assumption regarding the date of creation may not be a realistic assumption. See infra Part IV.F.
181. See R. § 9-322 cmt. 9, example 13.
182. Id. § 9-322(f)(1).
183. Id. § 9-322 cmt. 8.
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Revised section 9-327 come back into play, and whoever has control
of that account has priority over all other claimants.
c. A Short Walk Through the Brambles-An Attempt to Explain How
Revised Section 9-322 Works
The following examples attempt to summarize these rules.
Assume that Debtor D owes a significant sum to Bank A, where it
keeps its operating bank account. D wants to finance a new line of
inventory and convinces Vendor B to sell it inventory on a 100%
purchase-money secured basis. B checks the filing record and finds
that no financing statement has been filed against D. B then files its
financing statement against D on Day 1. It then ships goods to D on
Day 2. On Day 3, D sells the goods on thirty-day terms to Buyer C.
On Day 33, C sends a check to D in full satisfaction of its debt. On
Day 34, D receives the check, endorses it, and deposits it in its
account at Bank A.
Examine the results at each stage of the transaction. As of Day 2,
B has a perfected security interest in the inventory, and Bank A has
no interest in it whatsoever since D did not use any funds from the
deposit account to acquire the inventory. On Days 3 through 33, the
same result obtains; B has a perfected security interest in the account
generated on sale, and A still has no interest in the account. When the
check is given to D, again the same result; as identifiable cash
proceeds, B's interest continues as a perfected interest in identifiable
proceeds (the check). When the check is deposited, however, the
collected proceeds become subject to Bank A's security interest, and
under Revised section 9-327, Bank A has priority.184
Now change the facts. Instead of Vendor B, assume that D goes
to Bank B and arranges to borrow funds to finance its inventory. On
Day 1, B files its financing statement against the inventory after
checking the filing record and finding no financing statements on file
against D. On Day 2, B gives D a check for its loan, which D deposits
in its deposit account at Bank A. D then writes a check against that
account to purchase the inventory which is delivered on Day 3.185 On
the same day, D sells the goods to Buyer C on thirty-day terms. On
184. The purchase money priority rules in Revised section 9-324 are expressly subject to
security interests perfected by control under Revised section 9-327. See id. § 9-324(a)-(b).
Would the result change if D deposits the check in another bank? Yes. Since Bank A had
no claim to the original inventory, it would have no claim to any proceeds, either.
185. Assume, for purposes of this modification of the hypothetical, that the lender finances
100% of the acquisition price.
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Day 33, C sends D a check in full satisfaction of its debt. D receives

the check on Day 34, endorses it, and deposits it in its account at
Bank A.
Now examine the results at each stage of this modified

transaction. Once the loan funds are part of the deposit account at
Bank A, Bank A has priority since it has control.1 6 When D writes the

check to purchase the inventory, the result does not change, since the
check is not considered proceeds of the deposit account. 187 Once the
inventory is delivered on Day 3, both A and B have a perfected

security interest in the goods; A's claim is as proceeds from the
deposit account, and B's is a claim as to the inventory as original

collateral. At this point, B's claim is superior under the rule stated in
Revised section 9-322(d), which allocates priority to the first to file,
188
which in this case is B.

When the inventory turns into an account on Day 3, both A and
B continue to have perfected security interests in the account. Since
an "account" is not "cash proceeds," we again have to look to

subsection (d) of Revised section 9-322. Under this rule, the first to
file has priority, which in this case would again be Bank B.
What then happens on Day 33 when C sends its check? The
check is cash proceeds of the account, but is it also cash proceeds of
all prior forms of the collateral as well? This matters if Bank A does
not file within twenty days after the sale. Without a filing, Bank A will
become unperfected as to the account as of Day 24 (twenty-one days

after attachment, which occurred on Day 3). Does it become reperfected upon transmutation of the account into identifiable cash
proceeds? The answer is yes at one level-it surely has an interest in
the check senior to that of a lien creditor or anyone having the status
of a lien creditor. 89 The next question is priority as between the two
186. I assume here that B also takes a security interest in its loan proceeds check, a fairly
standard loan provision. This interest would then follow as a proceeds interest, albeit a
subordinate one, into the deposit account at Bank A. Otherwise, B would have no interest in the
deposit account at Bank A.
187. See R. § 9-332 cmt. 2, example 1. Although the check may be proceeds in the hands of
the recipient, it is not from the perspective of the secured party with a security interest in the
account against which the check is drawn. Since that check does not operate independently to
assign the funds, see U.C.C. § 3-408, the check itself should not be considered proceeds. When
the check is paid, however, the funds or credits used in payment should be considered proceeds
since there then is a transfer of funds.
188. See R. § 9-322 cmt. 9, example 12.
189. This is because it can identify the check as proceeds of its collateral through tracing,
and "a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral" Id. § 9-315(a)(2).
This security interest is perfected, and thus senior to a lien creditor, since the check is "cash
proceeds," see id. § 9-102(a)(9), and since tracing allows the secured party to identify it to the
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parties; in short, who does Revised section 9-322 favor? The quick
answer is that, at this point, the general rules of subsections (a) and
(b) apply, and priority goes to the first to file or perfect. The special
priority rule of subsection (d) is inapplicable. Thus, the issue is
whether A was first to "file or perfect."' 19
On this point, section 9-322(a)(1) is clear: "Priority dates from
the earlier of the time a filing covering the collateral is first made or
the security interest or agricultural lien is first perfected, if there is no
period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection." 191 Thus,
92
the gap caused by its failure to file dooms Bank A's priority claim.
B's victory, however, is short-lived. The instant D deposits the
check into its deposit account at A, the priority rules of Revised
section 9-327 will apply, giving the nod to A who has control.
Note that the result potentially shifts if the check is deposited
into a deposit account at another bank. Both A and B will stay
perfected at this point, since a deposit account is cash proceeds, 193 and
since both (by hypothesis) can trace their interests into that account.
Without clearcut control, the general rules of subsections (a) and (b)
again apply, leaving the break in priority issue (the gap from Day 25
to Day 33 in the example) to regulate the outcome. 94 Since the break
moves up A's date of "filing or perfection" under section 9-322(a)(1),
B wins because its period of continuous perfection is longer.195
F. Duties and Privilegesof Secured Party
Under Revised Article 9, a secured party with a security interest
in a deposit account takes on special duties and, to the extent that it is
also the depository bank, acquires special privileges. The duties are
based upon those of a secured party in possession of collateral and
upon the statute. The privileges come in the form of an explicit
retention and recognition of non-Article 9 rights such as setoff.

original collateral, see id. § 9-315(d)(2).
190. See id. § 9-322(a)(1).
191. Id. Subsection (b) clarifies the fact that the same rule carries over for proceeds: "[Tihe
time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in collateral is also the time of filing or
perfection as to a security interest in proceeds." Id. § 9-322(b)(1).
192. See id. § 9-322 cmt. 8, example 11.
193. See id. § 9-102(a)(9).
194. See id. § 9-322 cmt. 8, example 11.
195. B can influence this result by requiring D to deposit checks into a lock box or other
account to which it has control, since by having control it defeats all other secured creditors. See
id. § 9-327.
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1. Duties-Revised Section 9-208(b)
Revised section 9-208(b) sets forth formal requirements for when
a secured party with deposit account collateral is required to
relinquish it. Before these requirements apply, however, there are
two conditions. First, there must be "no outstanding secured
obligation.' 1 96 Second, the "secured party [must not be] not
committed to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give
value."' 19 In other words, the lending relationship must be over or its
commencement must be solely in the secured party's control.
If those conditions exist, then the debtor can obtain the release
of any secured creditor control of the deposit account by sending an
"authenticated demand" and then waiting ten days. 98 At the end of
that period, if the secured creditor has control under Revised section
9-104(a)(2), the secured party must "send to the bank with which the
deposit account is maintained an authenticated statement that
releases the bank from any further obligation to comply with
instructions originated by the secured party."' 99
If the secured party, however, has control pursuant to Revised
section 9-104(a)(3)-that is, if it is the customer on the account-then
the secured party must "(A) pay the debtor the balance on deposit in
the deposit account; or (B) transfer the balance on deposit into a
deposit account in the debtor's name."' ° The comments indicate that
this duty is subject to the terms of the collateral itself: "subsection
(b)(3) should not require a secured party with control to make an
early withdrawal of the funds (assuming that were possible) in order
to pay them over to the debtor or put them in an account in the
debtor's name." 20 1
Revised section 9-208(b) does not mention control under section
9-104(a)(1), such as when the secured party is a bank and the deposit
account is maintained with it. The omission is presumably because at
least one of the preconditions for release can never be met, that of
196. Id. § 9-208(a).
197. Id.
198. See id. § 9-208(b). The comments indicate that these requirements may be varied under
the general rule of section 1-102(3). For example, "a debtor could by contract agree that the
secured party may release its control of investment property under subsection (a)(1) more than
three days following demand." Id. § 9-208 cmt. 2. To the extent that many lenders will
automatically provide for their own standards in deposit agreements or other arrangements, the
default rules in Revised section 9-208 may not have significant application.
199. Id. § 9-208(b)(1).
200. Id. § 9-208(b)(2)(A)-(B).
201. Id. § 9-208 cmt. 2.
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there being no possibility of the secured party not owing any
obligation to the debtor. A bank will always have a contingent
obligation to return the funds equal to the account balance, and thus a
debtor who has granted a security interest to its bank will never be
able to use Revised section 9-208(b).
If a secured party does not honor a proper request under section
9-208(b), then it will incur liability similar to that imposed upon other
secured creditors under Revised section 9-625(e) when they fail to
release termination statements after proper notice. 20 2
2. Privileges-Revised Sections 9-341 and 9-342
Revised Article 9 gives banks maintaining deposit accounts
explicit protection of their position in the banking system. Revised
section 9-341 essentially provides that a bank retains all of its rights
and remedies with respect to a deposit account notwithstanding its
knowledge or notice of a security interest in that account. Thus, if a
non-bank secured party notifies a bank that it has taken a security
interest in a deposit account or files a financing statement to that
effect and sends a copy to the bank, the bank can ignore these notices.
Indeed, even if a lender has a legitimate security interest in the
deposit account and notifies the bank to turn over the funds to it, the
20 3
bank need not do so.
This rule is, however, subject to other law which may govern
when and how a bank may pay out funds subject to adverse claims.
This law may be found in judicial decisions or it may be statutory as in
certain adverse claim statutes.2 4 As indicated in the comments, the
responsibility for taking steps to freeze funds at the depositary bank
lies with the non-bank secured party: "A secured party who wishes to
deprive the debtor of access to funds on deposit or to appropriate
those funds for itself needs to obtain the agreement of the bank,
utilize the judicial process, or comply with procedures set forth in
20 5
other law.
In this way, the procedural nature of the relationship between
secured creditors claiming proceeds in the form of deposit accounts
and banks maintaining those accounts will continue as it is at present.

202. See id. § 9-208 cmt. 3.
203. See id. § 9-341(3).
204. For an explanation of such adverse claim statutes, see 1 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 8,
3.09[2].
205. R. § 9-341 cmt. 2.
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As a consequence, questions regarding whether a bank can continue
to honor checks drawn on the account or whether the bank can itself
reduce its exposure by setoff will be nonuniform and subject to
individual state variance.
This rule is subject to two exceptions: it does not apply if the
secured party is the bank's customer 2°6 and, thus, has control under
Revised section 9-104(a)(3), or if the bank has otherwise agreed in an
authenticated record. 2° As a consequence, the solution for secured
creditors, as indicated by the comments, is to obtain an agreement
with the bank as to when the bank will follow the secured party's
instructions when the secured party obtains control under section
9-104(a)(2).208 Any well-drafted control agreement will contain such
language.20 9 This is small consolation, however, to the non-bank
secured party whose collateral is sold and the proceeds transferred to
a bank with which the secured party has no subordination or control
agreement.
Revised section 9-342 takes this preservation one step further. It
explicitly provides that a bank need not enter into any control
agreement if it does not want to, even if its customer desires that the
bank do So. 210 Moreover, even if it enters into a control agreement, a
bank need not "confirm the existence of the [control] agreement to
another person unless requested to do so by its customer. ' 211 This
effectively isolates the bank from entering into any agreement it does
not wish to enter into and from disclosing whether anyone else may
have control.
3. Changes in Bank's Jurisdiction and Perfection -Revised Section
9-316(f)
Once control is obtained and the security interest perfected, a
secured party will want to maintain that perfection. Banks sometimes,
usually as part of an acquisition or other combination, change the
jurisdiction of their incorporation or change the location of an office
maintaining a particular deposit account. Should this occur under
206. See id. § 9-340(c).
207. See id. § 9-341.
208. See id. § 9-341 cmt. 2.
209. An example of such language can be found in the Deposit Account Control Agreement
Exemplar located in the Appendix to this article.
210. See R. § 9-342 ("This article does not require a bank to enter into an agreement of the
kind described in Section 9-104(a)(2), even if its customer so requests or directs.").
211. Id.
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Revised Article 9 and should the change affect the manner of
perfection, the secured party is protected for four months "after a
change of the applicable jurisdiction to another jurisdiction."21' 2
213
This section mirrors the four-month rule for goods generally. It
is hard to see exactly when it might be applicable, however. If a bank
changes jurisdiction from a jurisdiction which has not adopted
Revised Article 9 to a jurisdiction which has adopted Revised Article
9, there should be no gap since no public record necessarily publicizes
control and since existing Article 9 honors undocumented perfection
in "identifiable" cash proceeds in deposit accounts. 214 It would seem
that the primary realm of applicability might be in changes from a
jurisdiction that has adopted Revised Article 9 to a jurisdiction which
has not. In that case, the new state will likely treat the deposit account
not under Revised section 9-316(f) (since it has not adopted it yet),
but under existing Article 9 on the law of general intangibles or under
the common law outside of Article 9.
G. Enforcement
When a debtor defaults and the secured party has perfected its
interest in a deposit account through control, it has access to very
expeditious means of enforcement through Revised section 9-607. In
addition, if the secured party is also the bank maintaining the account,
it will have setoff rights as well.
1. Foreclosure of Security Interest-Revised Section 9-607
As with all security interests, the secured party realizes its key
benefit when the debtor defaults. It is then that the secured party may
by-pass the general state law collection scheme and claim priority
over competing interests. Revised Article 9 continues this benefit for
deposit accounts.
After default, a bank which both maintains and has control over
a deposit account "may apply the balance of the deposit account to
the obligation secured by the deposit account. '215 If the secured party
has control by virtue of an agreement with the bank maintaining the
account, or because it is the customer, it may upon default "instruct

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. § 9-316(f)(2).
See id. § 9-316(a)(2).
See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b).
R. § 9-607(a)(4).
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the bank to pay the balance of the deposit account to or for the
217
benefit of the secured party. '216 In either case, this "self-help"
remedy allows the secured party to reduce the secured obligation
218
dollar for dollar from the balance on account.
If a secured party is perfected but does not have control (as will
be the case when the secured party is claiming only a proceeds
interest), Revised Article 9 maintains the current procedural status of
the secured party and does not offer any self-help remedies. 219 The
secured party will have to use judicial means, under an adverse claims
statute or otherwise, or enlist the consent of the debtor to obtain the
funds.
Secured parties perfected by control are not totally
unconstrained in exercising this self-help remedy. Revised section
9-607(c) imposes a duty to proceed in a commercially reasonable
manner when taking steps to apply the balance of the deposit account
against the secured debt. This duty derives from the statute which
says that "[a] secured party shall proceed in a commercially
reasonable manner if the secured party: (1) undertakes to collect from
or enforce an obligation of an account debtor or other person
obligated on collateral.' 220 In the case of a deposit account, the bank
maintaining the account is a "person obligated" upon it; those basic
duties derive from the deposit agreement and Article 4. Thus, in the
case of a secured party perfected by a control agreement or when it is
the customer, it is relatively clear that the secured party must
"proceed in a commercially reasonable manner. '22 An example of
acting contrary to this duty might be causing the debtor to incur early
withdrawal penalties on a interest bearing time deposit by
withdrawing the funds a day before maturity when there is no
showing of any necessity to act quickly.
The interpretation is less clear if the secured party and the
depositary bank are one and the same. In this case, the bank will be
perfected under Revised section 9-104(a)(1), and to apply section
216. Id. § 9-607(a)(5).
217. See id. § 9-607 cmt. 7.
218. The use of the permissive "may" does not indicate discretion, in the case in which the
bank maintaining the account is not the secured party, to pay the balance. The bank maintaining
the account has no discretion in that regard. This obligation arises from the nature of control.
See id. § 9-104(a)(2)-(3). Rather, the use of "may" in both paragraphs (4) and (5) confers
discretion on the secured party as to how to best proceed.
219. See id. § 9-607 cmt. 7.
220. Id. § 9-607(c)(1) (emphasis added).
221. Id. § 9-607(c).
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9-607(c) would literally mean that the words "secured party" and

"person obligated" would have the same referent. In other words, one

would read section 9-607(c) to say that by applying the balance, the
"secured party [the bank] ... undertakes to collect from ... an ...

other person obligated on collateral [again, the bank]." In other
words, applying a debtor's account balance to the secured obligation

is "collecting" from oneself. While this locution is not elegant, the
interpretation incorporating it preserves consistency in application
and, thereby, does not give a preference to various forms of control
which are available only to a particular subset of secured parties.
2. Exercise of Setoff or Recoupment Rights-Revised Section 9-340
The final hurdle a secured party needs to cover is the setoff and

222
recoupment rights of the bank maintaining the deposit account.

Under current law, a secured party with a perfected proceeds interest
in a deposit account generally defeats a depositary bank's setoff
223
rights.
Revised Article 9 changes this dramatically. Under Revised
section 9-340, the depositary bank's setoff rights are superior to the
secured party's security interest.22 4 This provision was intended to

resolve an untidy and nonuniform set of priority rules between banks
exercising setoff and secured parties (or competing lienholders).215
In addition, if the secured party is also the depositary bank, it

need not elect between setoff rights and security interests; it may
enjoy both simultaneously. 226 The only way, short of subordination, to

avoid the priority of the depositary bank is to obtain control by
222. Under current law, setoff rights are excluded from Article 9, see U.C.C. § 9-104(i), an
exclusion which Grant Gilmore thought unnecessary and forced upon him by banking interests.
As he famously said:
This exclusion [of setoff rights] is an apt example of the absurdities which result when
draftsmen attempt to appease critics by putting into a statute something that is not in
any sense wicked but is hopelessly irrelevant. Of course a right of set-off is not a
security interest and has never been confused with one: the statute might as
appropriately exclude fan dancing.
1 GILMORE, supra note 23, § 10.7, at 315-16.
223. See CLARK, supra note 29, 3.11 ("The courts almost always give priority to the
Article 9 claimant, whether the matter is resolved under Article 9 or by fashioning a common
law priority rule.").
224. See R. § 9-340(a).
225. See id. § 9-340 cmt. 2.
226. See id. § 9-340(b). Of course, Revised Article 9 does not create setoff or recoupment
rights; those are a creature of non-UCC law. See id. § 9-340 cmt. 2. Also, in enforcement of
remedies, the depositary bank may wish to be clear about how it is proceeding; proceeding
under a security interest brings with it the obligation to proceed in a commercially reasonable
way. See id. § 9-607(c). Setoff rights are not similarly regulated by Revised Article 9.
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becoming the bank's customer;227 not only will this give priority over
the depositary bank's security interests in the deposit account, 228 but
also will prevail against any rights of setoff the bank may have against
229
the debtor.
III. INITIAL RESPONSES TO REVISED ARTICLE 9
Overall, the deposit account provisions give great flexibility to
depositary banks. The automatic perfection rules, combined with the
retention of setoff rights and the privilege against disclosing or giving
control to any other entity, clearly puts depository banks in a strong
legal position. How will they react?
A. Universal Taking of Security Interest in DepositAgreements
Given the ease with which a depositary bank can acquire a
security interest and given the large potential benefits, I predict that
banks will place language granting a security interest in deposit
accounts in all their deposit account agreements. This language can be
as innocuous as placing something like the following in all business
banking accounts: "Depositor hereby grants a security interest in the
deposit account hereby created to secure all present and future
obligations owed to Bank."
But what if the bank does not want to assess, on a case by case
basis, whether an account is used "primarily" for business or
consumer purposes? As I indicate later, 23° many small businesses
seem to engage in the ill-advised practice of not creating a separate
legal entity with which to conduct business. It would be
administratively easy to simply print on each new signature card the
following:
Depositor hereby grants, to the fullest extent provided by law, a

security interest in the deposit account hereby created to secure
any and all debts owed by depositor to bank, whether now existing
or hereafter created, and regardless of whether such obligations be
related to the purposes for which this account is opened.
This might be inserted in consumer deposit account agreements; the
"to the fullest extent provided by law" would exclude those accounts

227.
228.
229.
230.

See
See
See
See

id. § 9-104(a)(3).
id. § 9-327(4).
id. § 9-340(c).
infra text accompanying note 249.
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"primarily" used for consumer purposes.23 '
Moreover, since there is no signed writing requirement for
attachment of an interest in a deposit account, many banks may take
advantage of provisions in their deposit agreements and simply notify
their customers of the change, along with an option to close the
account if the customer does not agree to the change.
Although a debtor might have some defenses based on the
nature of the deposit agreement as an adhesion contract and the
consequences being unanticipated or contrary to expectations, 23 2 that
is a weak argument especially if the debtor is somehow engaged in
business and presumptively able to fend for herself. Most of the law
regarding amendments by waiver or estoppel are consumer cases in
which concerns regarding consumer protection tend to skew the
233
analysis.
As a consequence, most banks will immediately change their
deposit agreements to provide for a security interest, and every
debtor counsel will have to assume that such security interests are in
place.
B. UniversalRequests for SubordinationAgreements
Debtors are not the only ones affected. Many lenders are not
banks and, thus, cannot maintain or hold the deposit accounts of their
debtors. Given the presumed universality of the grant of a security
interest, most non-bank lenders (such as asset-based lenders) will not
lend to debtors unless the debtor provides a subordination (or better
yet, a control) agreement for each and every deposit account the
debtor has. In addition, such loan agreements will undoubtedly
provide for increased monitoring of debtor activity (the cost of which
the debtor will bear) to ensure that the debtor does not create any
new deposit accounts and divert collateral proceeds into them.
231. Such an action might work under Revised Article 9, but its efficacy under various state
consumer protection or unfair trade practices law would have to be examined on a state by state
basis.
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) (regarding contract of
adhesion). See generally 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I (1999) (Official Staff Interpretation Under
Regulation Z on 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(d)(2)) (suggesting that taking security interest in deposit
account to secure credit card obligation must be specifically intended by cardholder, which
could be shown by separately initialing the grant, by placing the security grant on a separate
page, or by referencing the deposit account by identifying number or by a minimum balance).
233. See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(unilateral amendment to credit card agreement adopting binding arbitration not valid against
consumers notwithstanding fact that original agreement allowed bank to change terms by notice
to customer).
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Depositary banks will, in the long run, accept such agreements,
but can also be expected to pass along any increased costs for such
agreements given section 9-342's privilege against following its
customer's desires in this regard.
C. Global Deals Among Non-Bank Secured Partiesand Banks
The cost of negotiating and entering into individual
subordination agreements will likely create incentives for non-bank
lenders and bank lenders to form alliances. These alliances will be
based on standard terms of subordination or control with respect to
deposit accounts and will likely standardize the terms and the costs to
be paid by the debtor for each such agreement entered into.
IV. POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH REVISED ARTICLE 9's TREATMENT

OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS

If private markets react by creating a web of agreements as
indicated above, is all well? I wonder. As complete as it purports to
be, the implementation of the decision to bring deposit accounts
within Article 9 is not without some problems. Most of these are
practical; that is, while the text of Revised Article 9 may be internally
coherent, the application of that text to the world of commerce may
have a few bumps.
A. Problems with Coverage and Choice of Law
Revised Article 9's choice of law provisions related to deposit
accounts seem to have a displaced focus. By this, I mean that they
seem to be drafted for the statute books of those states which have
not yet adopted Revised Article 9 in that they seem to bend over
backwards to direct a court to a state agreed to by the parties or in
which the depositary bank is located.2 34 This is particularly apparent if
the parties' agreement selects a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction; as the
comments indicate, "[t]he parties' choice is effective, even if the
jurisdiction whose law is chosen bears no relationship to the parties or
'235
the transaction.
To assess the possible effect of this expansion, it is important to
separate true conflicts from false ones. In any litigation, if a lender

234. See R. § 9-304.
235. Id. § 9-304 cmt. 2.
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claims a security interest in a deposit account located in a state other
than the forum state, the forum court will look to the forum state's
conflicts of laws rules to resolve any dispute. If both the forum state
and the state whose law the parties have selected have the same
version of Article 9, then there is no problem. Each state will apply
the identical version of the law.
Potential problems arise, however, when the conflict involves
two states which have differing versions of Article 9.236 There are four
possibilities to consider. The first arises if the forum state is a Revised
Article 9 state, and the security agreement governing the deposit
account selects nonforum and, hence, non-Revised Article 9, law.
Here, if the parties have chosen non-Revised Article 9 law, that law
will likely govern, and the secured party will be held not to have an
interest in the deposit account for the simple reason that it agreed to
7
law which did not recognize such interestsY
A second possibility is that the parties select forum law (assumed
to be Revised Article 9) to govern a deposit account that is set up and
maintained in a nonforum state, and the nonforum state does not
recognize security interests in deposit accounts. The issue here is
whether the forum state will recognize the existence of a property
interest when such an interest would not be recognized in the other
state-in short, whether the forum state will tolerate different results
depending on the court in which the parties litigate the dispute. This
is not much different than if a married couple in a community
property state attempted to take title to valuable personal property as
tenants by the entireties2 38 and thereafter moved to an entireties state
and asserted immunity against a creditor of only one of the spouses.
Would the forum state respect the property laws of the nonforum
state, and its effect on creditors, in a way that alters third party rights?
The answer is not clear to me.
236. Throughout this section, I assume the issue is one of a security interest in a deposit
account as original collateral and that issues of proceeds are not considered. This could occur,
for example, if a bank took a security interest in a deposit account that did not contain any
proceeds of any security interest.
237. If the security agreement is silent, the court will then turn to Revised section 9-304's
default rules and will look to see where the account was set up or, barring ail else, where the
bank's chief executive office is located. See R. § 9-304(a).
238. There is often good reason to do this: many states recognize such property as immune
from the claims of creditors of just one spouse. See, e.g., Crawford v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 139 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (personal property can be held as
tenants by the entireties and when so held is immune from execution and levy by a creditor of
only one of the spouses); Pitts v. United States, 408 S.E.2d 901, 904-05 (Va. 1991) (notes
received in sale of real property held as tenants by the entireties kept entireties character;
therefore, creditor of only one spouse could not execute on notes).
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The questions become more complicated when the forum state
has not adopted Revised Article 9, and the parties' agreement adopts,
as to deposit accounts, the law of a jurisdiction that has adopted
Revised Article 9.239 In this case, the forum state will likely apply
240
section 1-105 as the test for validation of the choice of law clause.
Under section 1-105, however, the parties may agree to apply a
particular state's law only when "a transaction bears a reasonable

relation to this state and also to another state.1 24 1 Simply choosing a
state for its law, however, is likely not a sufficient basis under section
1-105,242 especially when such a choice affects not only the rights of
the parties inter se, but also the rights of third parties. Thus, if the only

connection to a state is the parties' selection of it in their agreement,
it is doubtful that section 1-105, as it is currently read, will validate it.
Note, however, that none of these resolutions turns on a reading
of Revised section 9-304. This brings me back to my opening
assertion: the provisions of Revised section 9-304 would make life a
lot easier if they were in the laws of non-Revised Article 9 states. But
they are not, and the choice of law provisions thus seem, at least
domestically, 43 to not have much ultimate impact.
The question turns on whether the state where the dispute is
decided will honor the property interest in the deposit account, and
proceeds, created under the law of another state. If the two states at
issue have both adopted Revised Article 9, then there is no issue,
239. I assume here that the parties have picked the Article 9 jurisdiction for no reason other
than the favorable treatment it gives deposit accounts. For purposes of making the question
easier, I assume that the debtor and the depositary bank have no other connections with the
state chosen, since the comments to Revised section 9-304 would validate a choice of law clause
"even if the jurisdiction whose law is chosen bears no relationship to the parties or the
transaction." R. § 9-304 cmt. 2.
240. I assume here that the non-Revised Article 9 state will not apply its version of section
9-103 since Current Article 9 excludes deposit accounts and, thus, section 9-103 would not
directly apply.
241. U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
242. As stated in Superfos Investments Ltd. v. FirstmissFertilizer,Inc.:
"The parties' choice should be upheld unless the transaction lacks a normal connection
with the state whose law was selected. Only when it is shown that the contact did not
occur in the normal course of the transaction, but was contrived to validate the parties'
choice of law, should the relationship be held unreasonable; in other cases, it should be
upheld."
809 F. Supp. 450, 453 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (quoting Robert J. Nordstrom & Dale B. Ramerman,
The Uniform Commercial Code and the Choice of Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 623, 628); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 187(2) (1971) (contractual rights should govern
unless the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there
is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice).
243. It is conceivable that parties could agree to apply some foreign law to the account and,
thus, the choice of law provisions could point outside of Revised Article 9, but it is unclear why
someone would do that.
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since the law has the same text in both places. If, however, the state
where the dispute arises has not adopted Revised Article 9, then the
fate of the secured party's interest is less secure.
B. DefinitionalProblems
In order to avoid problems with consumer protection concepts,
Revised Article 9 limits a debtor's ability to grant a security interest
in deposit accounts by excluding "an assignment of a deposit account
in a consumer transaction."' 244 While this exclusion covers most
consumer deposit accounts, it may not be sufficiently clear at the
margins to avoid problems, and the margins (that is, the number of

affected cases) may be wide.
The problem stems from the definition of "consumer
transaction." This definition would permit the inclusion of some

consumer accounts; a consumer transaction is one that is primarily,

not exclusively, for personal, family, or household purposes. 245 Thus, a
deposit account held by a sole proprietor may be subject to a security
interest if the bank's standard deposit agreement takes a security
interest in it, even if the proprietor also uses the account to buy the
246
weekly groceries.
This may occur more often than may have been thought. By
recent counts, somewhere between 10% and 15%,247 and perhaps as
much as 36%,248 of all chapter 11 bankruptcy cases are filed by
individuals. When combined with business chapter 13 filings, 249 it may
be that individuals are the debtors in almost 61% of all business
244. R. § 9-109(d)(13).
245. See id. § 9-102(a)(26).
246. Troublesome issues regarding the preservation of exemption rights in deposit accounts
would also arise, especially since most exemption laws permit the encumbrance of exempt
property pursuant to a consensual security interest. See Sepinuck, Defense, supra note 19, at
535-37. But see 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1994) ("The right of any person to any future payment under
this subchapter [regarding social security payments] shall not be transferable or assignable, at
law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the
operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law."); Ellender v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590, 599
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that section 407(a)'s ban extended to voluntary assignments executed
before receipt of funds, even when Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had issued
contrary regulations), appealdismissed, 781 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1986).
247. See Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Who Is Filing Chapter 11?, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Feb. 1999, at 30.
248. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, FinancialCharacteristicsof Businesses in
Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303,336-39 (1999).
249. Only individuals may be debtors under chapter 13, see 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994), and
chapter 13 relief expressly contemplates that some individuals may reorganize a business in a
chapter 13, see 11 U.S.C. § 1304(b).
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bankruptcies-a total of some 13,500 cases per year. 50° These cases
will likely present easy issues-but tough results-regarding whether
a checking account used for both family and business is used
"primarily" for consumer purposes. Under a plain reading of Revised
Article 9, it is not and, thus, the family's operating funds will be
subject to the bank, along with the likely loss of any state law
exemptions the family might have claimed.2 1
This problem will be more troublesome if banks, as a policy
matter, adopt general language for taking security interests in all their
deposit agreements. In short, if there are as many mixed accounts
supporting budding but incompetent entrepreneurs, then I suspect
that the effort to exclude consumers will result in a form of an
ignorance tax, in which consumers trying to start their own business
will unwittingly wind up giving their bank more than they believed
52
they were or that they wanted
C. Definitional Problems With a Bite-ResidentialMortgages and
Bankruptcy Cramdown
There are other practical reasons for banks to worry about
sweeping up sole proprietors' deposit accounts with broad language.
One of the earliest forms of securitization involved the market in
notes secured by homes. Indeed, the Government National Mortgage
Association-better known as "Ginnie Mae"-has securitized over $1
trillion dollars of mortgage-backed securities during its history. 253
Although a tale better told elsewhere, 254 the Bankruptcy Code treats
holders of home mortgages differently than anyone else. While other
secured creditors risk cramdown if the value of the security dips
below the amount of their debt, 255 that is not the case with mortgages
250. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 248. This number is the combined number of
interpolated individual chapter lls with the actual number of business chapter 13s for the 1997
calendar year.
251. See Sepinuck, Defense, supra note 19, at 535-37.
252. This is a practical problem only to the extent that banking and lending relationships are
consolidated and to the extent that security interests in bank accounts have advantages over the
existing remedies of setoff.
253. Information taken from Ginnie Mae web site, About Ginnie Mae (visited Mar. 8, 1999)
<http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/mission.htm>.
254. See Mark S. Scarberry & Scott M. Reddie, Home Mortgage Strip Down in Chapter 13
Bankruptcy-A Contextual Approach to Sections 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5), 20 PEPP. L. REV. 425
(1993); Jane Kaufman Winn, Lien Stripping After Nobelman, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 541 (1994).
255. Technically, the plan "modifies" the debt so that the secured creditor receives a
payment stream over the life of the plan which is equal to the present value of the collateral, not
the present value of the debt. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2) (permitting modification in plan),
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secured by homes. Chapter 13 is explicit on this. Under section

1322(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which contains a list of permissible
plan provisions, it allows chapter 13 debtors to
modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in realproperty that is the debtor's

or leave
principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims,
256
unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims.

As a consequence, chapter 13 debtors may not modify a home
mortgage loan in most cases. The exceptions, however, are key. The

statutory exception applies only to "claim[s] secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence." 27 Courts have construed the modifier "only" to mean just

that; if the lender takes other real property security258 or any other
personal property security, it loses the protection of section
1322(b)(2). 259 The loss of this exception has even been found when the
26°
lender took an interest in a deposit account under non-UCC law.
Lenders should, thus, think twice before unthinkingly inserting

blunderbuss provisions granting security interests in agreements
governing deposit accounts, lest they lose the ability to sell the real

estate loans they generate in the secondary market. A better course
of action would seem to be to put such provisions in agreements
related to business accounts only and to keep them out of consumer
261
deposit agreements entirely.
1325(a)(5) (1994) (allowing nonconsensual confirmation if plan returns present value of
collateral to secured creditor over life of plan). Similar provisions apply in chapter 11 cases. See
id. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1129(b)(2)(A).
256. Id. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). Chapter 11 has a similar section, added in 1994. See
id. § 1123(b)(5).
257. Id. § 1322(c)(2) (emphasis added).
258. See In re McVay, 150 B.R. 254, 257 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993) (majority of space in property
securing debt was used as bed-and-breakfast establishment); In re Ramirez, 62 B.R. 668, 668-69
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986) (claim also secured by property used for rental); In re Morphis, 30 B.R.
589, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (claim also secured by adjoining vacant lot could be modified).
259. See, e.g., Caster v. United States (In re Caster), 77 B.R. 8, 10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)
(loss of exception when claim also secured by appliances); In re Lapp, 66 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1986) (loss of exception when claim also secured by irrigation equipment); In re Simpkins,
16 B.R. 956, 972 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (loss of exception when claim also secured by
debtors' motor home).
260. See In re Libby, 200 B.R. 562, 567 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1996) (provision in loan agreement
that took security interest in "all money, securities and other personal property on deposit or in
[the secured party's] possession or control" held to deprive lender on residential mortgage of
benefit of section 1322(b)(2)'s exclusion, even when lender held no actual security matching the
description).
261. Courts have also held that a secured party cannot release the additional security after
the bankruptcy has been filed; rather, a court will look at the state of security as of the date of
filing. See Johns v. Rousseau Mortgage Corp. (In re Johns), 37 F.3d 1021, 1025 (3d Cir. 1994); In
re Baksa, 5 B.R. 184, 187 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
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D. Problems with Attachment

Revised Article 9 adopts the notion of attachment by nonwritten
agreements.2 62 This adoption presumably borrows from the law of
possessory security interests, which presently do not require a writing,
or in the new parlance of Revised Article 9, a record. 263 With tangible
goods, part of the justification is that possession of the goods by
someone other than the debtor is itself sufficient evidence of the
intent to create a security interest and that disputes are, thus, less
likely. 264
I question whether this is sufficient for deposit accounts. When
an entity no longer possesses a good, this lack of possession justifies
the belief that the "owner" no longer has the full panoply of
ownership interests. The reason for this position turns, in part, on the
fact that the owner of goods usually possesses them. Initially then,
one should question whether justifications based on such assumptions
carry over cleanly to deposit accounts.
No one expects a debtor to maintain its own deposit account;
indeed, unless the debtor is itself a bank, it simply cannot happen.
This difference casts doubt on whether the inference that a lack of
"possession" of a deposit account automatically should put creditors
on notice that someone other than the debtor claims an interest in
that deposit account. It may be that the historic rights of setoff may
have created the necessary context, but since Revised Article 9 does
not purport to affect setoff rights, the inference is not a complete one.
In short, it may be that the casualness of attachment will lead to
the type of disputes that statute of frauds type legislation were
intended to prevent. The comment to Revised section 9-204 classes
deposit accounts with other types of security for which control is
necessary to perfect: investment property, electronic chattel paper, or
a letter-of-credit right. It then states that "control ... satisfies the

evidentiary test if control is pursuant to the debtor's security
agreement. "265
In each of these cases, however, there typically is someone other
than the bank involved in a prototypical transaction. Put another way,
262. See supra Part II.B.1.
263. UCC section 9-203(1)(a) requires no writing for attachment of a possessory security
interest; all that is required is that "the collateral is in the possession of the secured party
pursuant to agreement."
264. See U.C.C. § 9-203 cmt. 3.
265. R. § 9-203 cmt. 4.
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in the other types of transactions, third parties would normally look

to someone other than the person in "control" for clues as to the true
ownership of the collateral. When combined with the inevitable
differences in memory as to whether, and to what extent, the debtor

granted a security interest in a deposit account, it is regrettable that
the record requirement was not extended to the creation of security
interests in deposit accounts. 266
E. Tracing

Tracing is essential under Current Article 9 in order to identify
cash proceeds and, thus, maintain perfection in proceeds once they
are deposited into a deposit account. 267 Revised Article 9 carries
through this importance, but fails to identify a particular method for
tracing, or identifying, proceeds into deposit accounts. As Professors
Barnes and McLaughlin have pointed out, the current state of the law

is fairly settled, with most courts adopting some form of the lowest
268
intermediate balance test.

The problem, however, is in my use of the modifier "most." With
perfection turning on such an indefinite common law concept, it is to
be lamented that the drafters of Revised Article 9 did not adopt or at

least articulate a presumption in favor of one form of tracing over
another.2 69 In a sense, we want tracing to accomplish the impossible:
the allocation and division of a unified and indivisible obligation. Put

another way, tracing attempts to give property attributes to intangible
obligations. Given the strong base of property law that underlies
266. The problem also exists in Revised Article 8, which also seems to allow control by
nonrecorded means. See U.C.C. § 8-106(d).
This problem of a lack of a record could be exacerbated by practices that attempt to amend
a deposit account agreement by estoppel; that is, if banks send notices of change to customers
which take effect in the absence of the closing of the account.
On the other hand, if banks routinely insert security interest grants in the original deposit
agreements, perhaps the issue will never arise, or perhaps banks will take the position that their
historic rights of setoff have altered typically understandings about control, possession, and the
ability of third parties to reach a debtor's assets.
267. See U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2) (security interest attaches only in identifiable proceeds),
9-306(3)(b) (security interest remains perfected beyond ten-day grace period only in
"identifiable cash proceeds" such as deposit accounts).
268. See Barnes, supra note 27, at 331-32 & n.190; McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 46 n.7.
269. In California, for example, the legislature has adopted the lowest intermediate balance
test as presumptively correct when determining how much of a debtor's bank account is
allocable to exempt proceeds. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.080(c) (West 1987) ("The
tracing of exempt funds in a deposit account shall be by application of the lowest intermediate
balance principle unless the exemption claimant or the judgment creditor shows that some other
method of tracing would better serve the interests of justice and equity under the circumstances
of the case.").
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Revised Article 9's treatment of deposit accounts, something more
should have been offered.
F. Possible CircularPriorityIssues
Circular priority is a favorite of law professors. 27 0 Up to now, it
has been mostly a theoretical problem. 2 71 By introducing nontemporal
priority for perfection of deposit accounts, however, I think Revised
Article 9 potentially creates the potential for havoc in many
bankruptcies.
I base my fears on the following hypothetical. Debtor, D, has a
secured line of credit with asset-based lender, A. A has a properly
perfected, and unavoidable in bankruptcy, security interest in D's
inventory and all proceeds thereof. In addition, it is oversecured. D
also has an account with Bank B, and B has a clause in its standard
form deposit agreement granting B a security interest in the deposit
account to secure all obligations running from D to B. Further assume
that D owes B money and that the obligation exceeds the amount in
the deposit account; that is, B is an undersecured creditor. Finally,
assume that A and B have entered into an agreement pursuant to
which B agrees to subordinate its security interest in the account to
A's interest.
Now assume that D sells inventory and deposits the proceeds in
the account at B and such amount is traceable under local law.
Immediately after the funds clear, D files for bankruptcy.
As against the trustee, A's interest in the proceeds is perfected as
identifiable proceeds of the sale of the inventory. As against B,
however, A loses, since B has control of the account. 27 But since B
27 3
was undersecured, the transfer of the funds to B is preferential. It
270. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BAIRD & THOMAS JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS
ON BANKRUPTCY 321-22 (2d ed. 1990); 2 GILMORE, supra note 23, § 39.1-39.4, at 1020-46; J.A.
MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 226-27 (1956); Frank R. Kennedy,

The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65
MICH. L. REV. 1419, 1434 (1967); John C. McCoid II, Preservationof Avoided Transfers and
Liens, 77 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1991).
271. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, UCC Article 9 Drafting Committee Considers October 1996
Draft, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 54, 54-55 (1997) (reporting that Article 9 Drafting
Committee thought that circular priority issues, raised by other sections of Revised Article 9,
were rare in practice and handled well by courts when confronted and, thus, could be treated by
commentary).
272 See R. § 9-322(c).
273. As stated in Collier.
Payments to a partially secured creditor from property not covered by its lien,
however, have a preferential effect, because in a chapter 7 liquidation, that creditor
would receive a distribution for the full value of its secured claim, in addition to the
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can thus be set aside by the estate representative, either the debtor's
27 4
trustee in bankruptcy or the debtor in possession.
After avoidance, the trustee steps into B's position. Section 551
states that "[a]ny transfer avoided ... is preserved for the benefit of
the estate. '27 5 With the benefit of this statute, the trustee will take

over B's position, and thus have priority over A with respect to the
proceeds. The end result is the effective avoidance of A's interest in
all proceeds on deposit at Bank B (even though outside of bankruptcy
such proceeds were protected against lien creditors), simply because
another creditor, Bank B, happened to be undersecured at the time of

the filing.
A defense to this argument might be that an obligation such as a

deposit account is unitary. Thus, its date of transfer, for bankruptcy
purposes, would be the date of its creation, not the date of each
deposit. Each deposit would be analogized to a separate increase in
value of the encumbered asset, the deposit account, rather than a
separate and discrete transfer in its own right. This defense would
analogize deposits into the bank account to installment payments
under a executory contract to deliver goods or services. Bankruptcy
courts have generally held that when a debtor has granted a security

interest in an executory contract prepetition, payments earned and
made after filing are proceeds of that contract.27 6 As such, they are
payments already received. In other words, the payment would ordinarily be applied to
the unsecured portion of the undersecured debt, but would not reduce the lien or
increase the debtor's equity in the collateral.
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, 547.03[7] (footnote omitted); see Porter v.
Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d 355, 359 (10th Cir. 1989); Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504,
508-09 (7th Cir. 1981); Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy,
38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 744 (1985) ("That result could be avoided. The creditor could apply the
payment to the secured part of his claim by releasing a corresponding amount of collateral. But
there is no recorded instance of a partially secured creditor doing so. Instead, the creditor
always takes the payment and retains all of his collateral." (footnote omitted)).
274. Section 547 gives the power to avoid preferences to the trustee, and section 1107 of the
Bankruptcy Code gives the chapter 11 debtor in possession the powers of a trustee with respect
to such avoiding powers actions. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 1107(a) (1994).
275. Id. § 551.
276. The classic case is Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F.2d. 892 (2d Cir. 1942). Many recent
cases follow it with respect to the identity, as proceeds, of postpetition payments on executory
contracts entered into prepetition when the debtor had granted a prepetition security interest in
the executory contract. See Smoker v. Hill & Assocs., Inc., 204 B.R. 966, 975 (N.D. Ind. 1997)
(insurance commissions earned and paid postfiling by a chapter 13 debtor were proceeds of a
prepetition security interest created by a grant of a security interest in insurance commissions
"now due or that hereafter may become due," and thus not subject to section 552(a)); In re
Patio & Porch Sys., Inc., 194 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (payments earned and paid on
postpetition home improvement contracts were proceeds of a prepetition security interest in
"accounts receivable," and hence outside of section 552(a)); In re Rumker, 184 B.R. 621 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 1995) (chapter 13 debtor's unearned postpetition compensation from court-awarded

1999]

FROM PROPERTY TO CONTRACTAND

BACK

exempt from the general cutoff of security interests under section
277
552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
If this analogy holds, then any deposits made are proceeds, and
the transfer of the security interest related to each occurred at the
inception of the account. If the account was established beyond the
preference reachback period, 278 the deposits would then not be
preferential. since under this theory the transfer of the debtor's
interest in property, required for a preference, 279 occurred outside the
preference reachback period. In brief, B would argue that the deposit
account was no different from a static asset, such as a lump of gold,
which increased in value immediately before D's filing.
The problem with this approach is that Revised Article 9 itself
treats each deposit as a new transfer. By adopting tracing and by
permitting a secured party to use tracing techniques to allocate a part
of a deposit account as its proceeds collateral, Revised Article 9
preserves, at least to some extent, the separate identity of each
deposit, even though it has become part of the depositary bank's
undivided obligation. In this way, Article 9 harkens back to the
origins of deposit accounts and treats them as property by authorizing
division of the bank's undivided obligation to its customer to be
divided as if it were tangible property. Under this analysis, each
deposit would be a separate transfer (since the debtor would not have
rights in it until deposit) and, thus, each transfer would have to go
through a separate perfection analysis. In short, tracing divides the
indivisible nature of the bank's obligation, ensuring that the debtor's
separate and discrete deposits do not lose their discrete character
upon deposit. 28° Indeed, the whole concept of control as a means of
perfection rests on the shaky theoretical basis that the bank has the

contracts to represent indigents was proceeds of a prepetition security interest in "accounts
receivable," and hence outside of section 552(a)).
277. Under section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, security interests in after-acquired
property are cut off and terminated. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). Section 552(b), however, provides
that the termination of section 552(a) is not applicable to the extent that the postpetition
property is "proceeds" of a prepetition security interest. See id. § 552(b)(1).
278. This period is normally 90 days unless the recipient of the transfer was an insider (as
defined in section 101(31) of the Bankruptcy Code), in which case the reachback period would
be a year. See id. § 547(b)(4).
279. See id. § 547(b).
280. To a certain extent, other federal law recognizes this aspect of deposit accounts.
Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1998), obligates banks to make funds available to depositors on
the basis of what type of check the debtor deposited and when the debtor deposited it. This is so
even though there is not necessarily a connection between payment of the check by the payor
bank and the required availability of funds.
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ability to exclude others from the account, a property law concept. 281
Thus, so the estate representative would counter, a deposit account is
not like one gold nugget, but rather like a series of nuggets, with the
transfer of each nugget being a separate transfer for purposes of
preference law, and tracing being the method of disaggregating the
nuggets from the pile. 282
Another defense might be that the deposit of the check into the
deposit account was not a transfer and, thus, could never be a
preference. This argument turns on court interpretations that "to the
extent a deposit is made into an unrestricted checking account, in the
regular course of business and withdrawable at the depositor's will, it
is not avoidable by the trustee." 283 There is a kernel of an idea here,
but it lies not in the categorization of the deposit as a nontransfer.
The definition of a "transfer" under the Bankruptcy Code is broad
enough to pick up the transfer of funds represented by the deposit as
a transfer, 284 and even the legislative history indicates that "[a] deposit
in a bank account or similar account is a transfer." 285
Rather, the idea is that avoidance of the transfer will not benefit
the estate. 286 As stated in Collier, a deposit
281. The allowance of oral security agreements for deposit accounts, see supra Part II.B.1,
also evidences the treatment of a deposit account as if it were a tangible asset, capable of
possession.
282. This is supported by 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3), which states that a transfer cannot occur
until the debtor has rights in the property transferred. See Deardorff v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
(In re Deardorff), 195 B.R. 904, 911 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996) (fact that wage garnishment order
entered more than 90 days before bankruptcy did not protect wages paid within 90 days);
Canfield v. Simpson (In re Jones), 47 B.R. 786, 791 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (although
garnishment was outside of preference reachback period and, thus, transfer of funds outside that
time was not preferential, deposits made to bank account within 90 days of bankruptcy were
transfers and thus preferential). But see In re Wilkinson, 196 B.R. 311, 323 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1996) (execution lien obtained more than 90 days prepetition covered wages paid within 90 days
of petition).
283. In re Prescott, 805 F.2d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1986); see New York County Nat'l Bank v.
Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 145 (1904); Katz v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1977).
284. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a "transfer" is defined as:
every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of
redemption.
11 U.S.C. § 101(54).
285. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 27 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5813.
286. See Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Lineberger, 45 F.2d 522, 526-29 (4th Cir. 1930). Under
current law, the argument would be that the lack of benefit would mean a failure under section
547(b)(5) which requires the transfer to allow the creditor to receive more, as a result of the
transfer, than it would have in a chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)(A). This view
equates lack of estate benefit with the test in section 547(b), but this could be criticized
textually; it would exclude from preferential recoveries those transfers which affect only the
recovery of two creditors inter se, and not the general creditor body.
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may be withdrawn at the will of the depositor, and does not operate
to diminish the depositor's estate. The ordinary deposit results in
substituting for currency, bank notes, checks, drafts and other
bankable items, a corresponding credit with the bank which may be
withdrawn, and which provides the depositor
with the medium of
7
exchange in the transaction of business.2

The cases supporting this view, however, assume that the debtor will
have "unrestricted" access to the funds once deposited.2
Before Revised Article 9, the diminished access to the account by
reason of the bank's setoff was handled by section 553 of the
Bankruptcy Code. With Revised Article 9, however, many of the
cases that justify the "no preference" view seem suspect; they
indicate, in dicta, that a transfer for security would not give the debtor
"unrestricted" access.2s9 To a certain extent, this makes sense. Each
deposit increases the amount of security available to the depositary
bank, to the detriment of at least one other creditor. Moreover, to the
extent that the basis of perfection for the depositary bank is
"control,"29 then that also seems at odds with the underlying theory
of unrestricted access. The transfer thus seems preferential.
Is there a defense? There might be. In response to similar
problems with floating liens in inventory and receivables, 291 Congress
enacted section 547(c)(5). 292 In essence, this section dispenses with a
287. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29; I 547.03[1][b]; see Gilbert v. First Nat'l
Bank, 633 F.2d 686, 689 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980); Pioneer Liquidating Corp. v. San Diego Trust &
Sav. Bank (In re Consolidated Pioneer Mortgage Entities), 211 B.R. 704, 714-15 (S.D. Cal.
1997), affd in relevant part, 166 F.3d 342 (9th Cir. 1999).
288. See In re Prescott, 805 F.2d at 729; Katz, 568 F.2d at 969; Tonyan Constr. Co. v.
McHenry State Bank (In re Tonyan Constr. Co.), 28 B.R. 714, 728-29 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1983).
289. See, e.g., New York County Nat'l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 147 (1904) ("[A]
deposit of money to one's credit in a bank does not operate to diminish the estate of the
depositor, for when he parts with the money he creates at the same time, on the part of the
bank, an obligation to pay the amount of the deposit as soon as the depositor may see fit to
draw a check against it. It is not a transfer of property as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift or
security." (emphasis added)); New Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Gutterman (In re Applied Logic Corp.),
576 F.2d 952, 962 (2d Cir. 1978) (setoff); Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 45 F.2d at 527-28 (if deposit is a
"cloak for some other transaction, such as payment or the giving of security; ... equity, which
looks through form to substance, will treat the transaction according to its real nature"
(emphasis added)).
290. See R. § 9-104(a).
291. The problems were noted by the pre-Code cases of DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277
(9th Cir. 1969), and Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1969). The rationale of these cases was overruled by the adoption of 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3), but
their spirit was attempted to be captured in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5).
292. Section 547(c)(5) states that:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the
proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to
the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to
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transfer by transfer analysis in favor of looking at the aggregate effect
of all transfers during the applicable reachback period. This analysis
first looks to see to if the effect of all transfers during the reachback
period was to better the position of the secured creditor. If not, then
section 547(c)(5) provides a defense to the recipient, even if
individual transfers might have been preferential. If, however, the
position is bettered, then section 547(c)(5) gives a defense only to the
extent necessary to preserve the recipient's position at the beginning
of the reachback period. In other words, the estate will be able to
avoid the security interest in receivables and inventory existing on the
date of the bankruptcy petition to the extent the aggregate effect of
all the transfers was to better the secured party's position.
By way of example, assume that a debtor owed an inventory
lender $1000 throughout the ninety days preceding the filing of a
bankruptcy case. As of the date ninety days before the filing, its
collateral (inventory) was worth $600. At the date of filing, it was
worth $800. Although it is likely that all the inventory was sold and
restocked during this period, not every transfer of inventory is
avoided. The secured party has a defense to the extent of its original
position ninety days before bankruptcy; that is, to the extent of $600.
This means that $200 worth of the security interest is avoided as
29 3
preferential.
How does this apply to security interests in deposit accounts?
Section 547(c)(5) is a limited defense. It only applies to transfers
which create a security interest. And then only to the extent that the
security interest is in inventory or receivables. The possible saving
point here is in the definition of "receivable." For purposes of this
section only, the Bankruptcy Code defines receivable as a "right to
payment, whether or not such right has been earned by
performance.

' 294

As indicated above, 295 a deposit account is nothing

the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which
the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all security
interests for such debt on the later of(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section
applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section
applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement
creating such security interest.
293. I assume here that the inventory lender is not able to trace the acquisition of all new
inventory to proceeds of prior sales.
294. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(3) (1994).
295. See supra note 2.
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more than an obligation of the bank maintaining the deposit to pay
out funds pursuant to the depositor's order; in short, it would appear
to fit into the expansive definition of "receivable" contained in
section 547(a).296 Although this does not remove the preference
problem, it has the tendency to minimize it.
G. The Price of "Control"
In borrowing the concept of control from investment securities,
Revised Article 9 opens up serious questions regarding the banking
relationship. In this respect, I refer particularly to the secured party's
becoming the depositary bank's customer, as anticipated in section
9-104(a)(3). In some cases, such as nonoperating accounts or
investment accounts, this treatment may make sense. But when the
debtor's business requires some access to the funds, is this scheme
practical?
In essence, the issue resolves into whether the debtor can issue
checks or other orders under its signature that the depositary bank is
obligated to honor, even though the debtor is no longer the bank's
customer. Put another way, can one be a drawer on a check but not
the customer of the drawee? The current structure of Article 4 does
not explicitly anticipate this, and one might have to draw analogies to
the signing authority of corporate agents; in short, the secured party
might be the customer, but it can give temporary and unilaterally
revocable agency rights to the debtor to sign checks drawn on the
2 97
account.
Even if workable,2 9 such an arrangement begs the question of
296. See, e.g., Moreira v. Digital Employees Fed. Credit Union (In re Moreira), 173 B.R.
965, 972 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) ("The deposit account constitutes a claim against the Credit
Union. That claim is a receivable of the Debtor in which a security interest could be granted to a
third party." (footnote omitted)); In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992)
(deposit creates depositor's "right of payment").
297. Another practical question arises if the deposit account is interest bearing. The issue is
who the bank will report as the recipient of such income for tax purposes, such as when the
depositary bank must send out its 1099 forms. See generally 26 C.F.R. § 1.6041-1 (1998)
(collecting rules regarding reporting of interest). If the secured party has the interest credited to
the deposit account itself, it would seem that the secured party, as the customer on the account,
should be named on a Form 1099 filed by the bank. See id. § 1.6049-4(b)(1) ("[An information
return on Form 1099 shall be made for the calendar year showing the aggregate amount of the
payments, the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the person to whom
paid .... (emphasis added)).
298. There may be a lingering question as to whether the secured party is not only the
customer, but also the drawer with respect to the checks. UCC section 3-103(a)(3) identifies the
drawer not only as the person who signs the check, but also as the person "who is identified in a
draft as a person ordering payment." Thus, if the secured party's name appears on the check, it
may well incur liability as a drawer, since inclusion of their name would "identif[y] [them] in a
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who truly owns the funds in the deposit account. If the debtor retains
any ownership interest, that interest will become part of its
bankruptcy estate upon filing, 299 with all the attendant headaches that
might cause. 3°° Thus, opting for control by becoming a customer does

not eliminate bankruptcy problems.
If the secured party's position is that the debtor has no interest in

the account and, thus, it would not be part of any bankruptcy estate,
then questions are raised as to the vulnerability of the transfer of the
funds to the bank. A bank might take this position by asserting that

all deposits into the account in its name are transfers to the bank as
part of the overall credit arrangement and with the bank retaining the
discretion to hold the funds or apply them to any secured debt.
The basic problem with this position is that unless the debtor
receives "reasonably equivalent value" for the deposit of the funds in
the account, the deposit transaction is potentially vulnerable under
fraudulent transfer law. Under such law, if the secured party is held to
have given no value because of a lack of application of the funds to
the secured debt-or at least no reasonably equivalent value-for

each transfer, the transaction may be set aside by the debtor's
creditors or by its representative in bankruptcy.3 1' Thus, if a secured
party takes checks made payable to the debtor and deposits them in a

control account upon which it is the sole customer, the secured party
needs to give or have given reasonably equivalent value in order to
ensure an unavoidable transfer. Fortunately, simply by giving dollardraft."
In addition, to the extent that checks payable to the debtor are deposited in the account for
collection (and presumably application against the debt), the bank, as customer, will make
certain transfer warranties under UCC section 4-207. This should not cause many problems,
however, since the bank will likely not apply any proceeds to the debtor's outstanding loan until
the checks deposited are collected.
299. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case").
300. If the funds are part of the estate, then the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) applies
to block any setoff, see id. § 362(a)(7), or any other act to collect on a prepetition debt, see id.
§ 362(a)(6). The secured party, however, is entitled to protection of its interest in cash collateral,
see id. § 363(c)(2), and can put an administrative freeze on the account until the court has the
opportunity to address the issue of adequate protection of the cash collateral, see Citizens Bank
v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
301. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"), which is the law in
approximately 34 states, a transfer may be avoided by creditors (and perforce by the bankruptcy
trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)) if the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value as
its part of the transfer, and if before or because of the transfer the debtor was insolvent. See
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 330 (1999). Under the UFTA, a
transaction is vulnerable for four years. See id. § 9(b), 7A U.L.A. 359. The Bankruptcy Code has
a separate provision affecting transfers occurring within one year of the bankruptcy filing. See 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A).
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for-dollar credit for the deposits (subject to collection), banks can
give such value, 3 2 but this may limit a bank's discretion more than it
desires.
In short, upon transfer to the account, the lender needs to give
some value, although it would be difficult to calculate exactly how
much value would satisfy the tests of the necessary quantum of value
sufficient to satisfy either the state or federal tests of "reasonably
equivalent value." One wonders how this arrangement differs from
the normal "lock box" arrangement under which some secured
creditors require their debtors to have all payments sent to a separate
address, usually a post office box, and then, pursuant to authority
given in the security agreement, deposit such checks and apply the
collected balances against the outstanding loan.
If no such value is given, however, it may be that secured parties
unwittingly, in order to gain priority over the depositary bank,
become exposed to fraudulent transfer risk, a result clearly not
anticipated or desired.
In short, it appears that the "secured party as customer" option
gives the secured party very little in addition to well-negotiated
control or subordination agreements. Moreover, since the other party
to such negotiations will always be the same-the depositary bank-it
is unclear why the different form would be preferred or why the bank
would, for example, give up setoff rights simply because the secured
party will become the customer if it would not waive them in a
30 3
separate control or subordination agreement.
H. The Role of Setoff
The description in section 9-607 of how to enforce a security
interest-by "apply[ing] the balance of the deposit account to the
obligation secured by the deposit account" 3 0 - is indistinguishable
from a general description of setoff.3 5 Moreover, Revised section
9-340 confirms that "a bank with which a deposit account is
302. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § 3(a), 7A U.L.A.
295.
303. I am not the only one with such views. See BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK,
THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECrONS AND CREDIT CARDS 18.07 (Supp. 11998) ("In
reality, it may be that the lender-as-customer approach is impractical.").
304. R. § 9-607(a)(4).
305. See 2 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 8, T 18.01 (describing bank setoff as "[tihe legal
right of a financial institution to appropriate the deposit of its customer upon the customer's
default").
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maintained may exercise any right of recoupment or set-off against a
3 °6
secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account."

Is there a difference?
The short answer is that there is, and it usually works in the
bank's interest. A security interest in the deposit account will create a
property right to pursue and claim proceeds, whereas a setoff right, as
a mere personal or contractual right, will not. °7 The secured party's
property right may also give it greater flexibility on default.30 8 The
cases regarding joint owners of a deposit account seem to favor

creditors with a security interest against only one of the joint owners,
whereas the cases regarding setoff in a similar situation are a doctrinal
mess.309 Finally, security interests under Revised Article 9 will have
greater certainty of priority, especially against involuntary creditors
310
such as the IRS.
There are some qualities, however, that make setoff appear more
desirable. These appear mainly in the enforcement area. As indicated

above, when a bank proceeds under its security interest, it must
proceed in a commercially reasonable manner.31' That may not be the
case with respect to setoff.312 As a consequence, on default, a bank

with an option to proceed by setoff or by enforcement of its security
interest ought to think through exactly how it is proceeding, and
consider documenting that is proceeding under the avenue offering
the most advantageous consequences to it.

306. R. § 9-340(a).
307. There is a possibility, however, that such a property right may destroy mutuality, one of
the prerequisites for setoff. If so, then by taking a security interest, the depositary bank might
lose or limit its right of setoff. See Greene, supra note 15, at 283 & n.98. The argument would be
that the debt would no longer be mutual, since other creditors might be able to force the
depositary bank to marshal, analogizing to the case in which the debt is owed by the debtor and
the deposit account is opened by the debtor as an agent or as a trustee for another.
308. See, e.g., Balzano v. United Bank, N.A., 761 P.2d 229, 231 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(administrative freeze on account from which letter of credit draw would be reimbursed pending
draw justified by common law security interest in accounts); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 831 (N.Y. 1988) (administrative segregation on customer's checking
account justified by common law security interest in deposit account).
309. See 2 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 8, 18.06[4]; Sepinuck, Defense, supra note 19, at
512.
310. See Trust Co. v. United States, 735 F.2d 447 (11th Cir. 1984); 2 CLARK & CLARK, supra
note 8, J 18.14[1].
311. See R. § 9-607(c).
312. Cf. 2 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 8, 18.01 ("If the customer goes into default on its
obligations, the bank is entitled to immediate satisfaction by applying the same amount from the
deposit accounts-even without prior notice to the depositor-thus extinguishing the mutual
debts.").
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CONCLUSION

Robert Zadek has said about Revised Article 9: "'It's harder to
work through than the old Code. There's a huge learning curve and
it's chock-full of subtleties. If you don't wallow in it, you could get
nailed.'"313
With respect to deposit accounts, this description fairly applies.
While bringing almost excruciating clarity to the subject, Revised
Article 9's provisions on deposit accounts do have complexities that
bear more than one reading. The more one reads, the more one
confirms that these complexities do indeed fit together, and snugly.
More often than not, however, the result of these re-readings will
confirm what one initially suspected: the depositary bank always wins,
or at least starts out the game far ahead. This can be seen not only in
rules respecting perfection by, and only by, control, but also in the
reversal of current law regarding the victor in contests between
proceeds claims and offset rights.
Those most directly affected by these changes will be non-bank
lenders, including asset-based lenders and occasional secured parties
who finance their goods on a purchase money basis. Revised Article 9
has a solution for these parties: obtain control or subordination
agreements from every bank at which your debtor has, or will have, a
deposit account. This solution carries with it a price, a price which
includes the cost of dealing with depositary banks who begin such
negotiations with a strong hand and who indeed may ignore the
wishes of their customers on the topic. This price, however, far from
being paid by the non-bank secured parties, will inevitably be passed
along to debtors. Since existing laws that have brought deposit
accounts within existing Article 9 do not impose these types of costs,
we do not know whether Revised Article 9's deposit account
provisions will increase credit and reduce its cost. That is an empirical
question only time and experience will answer.

313. Mr. Zadek was quoted in Susan A. Bocamazo, Security Interests Changed Under
U.C.C., LAW. WKLY., Dec. 1, 1997, at 1.

APPENDIX
DEPOSIT ACCOUNT CONTROL AGREEMENT EXEMPLAR1

[LETTERHEAD OF DEBTOR]
[date]
[Depositary Bank]
Re:
DepositAccount ControlAgreement
Ladies and Gentlemen:
We are entering into financing arrangements with [Insert Name
of Lender] ("Lender"). In connection with those arrangements we,
together with Lender, ask you 2 to enter into this agreement with us
regarding the control of account number(s) [Insert identifying
account number or numbers], which we maintain with you ("Deposit
Account").'
As part of our financial arrangements with Lender, we have
agreed to grant to Lender a security interest in: (a) the Deposit
Account; (b) any cash balances from time to time credited to the
Deposit Account;4 and (c) any and all proceeds of either,' whether
1. Many thanks are due to Edwin Smith, Esq. of Bingham Dana LLP for permission to
reprint this form, which I have taken the liberty of slightly modifying.
2. The addressee is assumed to be the depositary bank. The depositary bank has no
obligation under Revised Article 9 to enter into a "control agreement" or, unless the depositary
bank otherwise agrees in a writing or other authenticated record, to take or refrain from taking
any other action as a result of the attachment or perfection of a security interest in favor of a
third party in a deposit account maintained with the depositary bank. See R. §§ 9-341, 9-342.
3. See id. § 9-102(a)(29) (defining "deposit account"). A "deposit account" does not
include "investment property" as defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(49). See id. Nor does the
definition of "deposit account" include an account evidenced by an instrument, see id., as
defined in Revised section § 9-102(a)(47), such as a transferable certificated certificate of
deposit. Revised Article 9 includes within its scope commercial deposit accounts, including
commercial checking and other commercial transaction accounts. See id. § 9-109 cmt. 16.
However, Revised Article 9 generally excludes from its scope deposit accounts, whether
checking or savings accounts, in consumer transactions. See id. § 9-109(d)(13).
4. If a security interest in a deposit account has attached, the security interest would
appear to extend to any cash from time to time credited to the deposit account. See id.
§ 9-204(a).
5. The attachment of a security interest in a deposit account gives the secured party an
attached security interest in identifiable proceeds of the deposit account. See id. §§ 9-203(f),
9-315. That security interest in identifiable proceeds continues perfected for 20 days and
continues perfected thereafter so long as the identifiable proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds
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now or hereafter existing or arising 6 (collectively, the "Deposit
Account Collateral").

In order to give Lender control over the account, as defined in
[Insert Citation to Applicable State Version of Section 9-104(a)(2)],
we hereby agree that Lender shall be entitled at any time to give you

instructions as to the withdrawal or disposition of any funds from time
to time credited to the Deposit Account, or as to any other matters
relating to the Deposit Account or any of the Deposit Account
Collateral.

You hereby agree to comply with any such instructions without
any further consent from us and without regard to any other

7
agreement that may exist between Lender and us.
We acknowledge that this agreement includes any and all
instructions which Lender may deliver to you. In particular, we

understand that such instructions may include the giving of stop
payment orders for any items being presented to the Deposit Account
for payment,8 and may include instructions to transfer funds to or for
the Lender's benefit.9
You shall be fully entitled to rely upon such instructions from

Lender even if such instructions are contrary to any instructions or
demands that we may give to you, even if the result of such

instructions is your dishonor of items which may be presented for
payment. ° In the event of any dishonor due to Lender's instructions,
we confirm that you shall have no liability to us for wrongful

or the other conditions in Revised section 9-315(d) are met.
6. A security interest generally may extend to after-acquired property. See id. § 9-204(a).
7. A security interest in a deposit account as original collateral must be perfected by
"control." See id. § 9-312(b)(1). The above language is the key language granting to the secured
party "control"-the depositary bank agrees that it will comply with instructions originated by
the secured party directing the disposition of funds in the deposit account without further
consent by the debtor. See id. § 9-104(a)(2).
8. The reference to stop payment orders may be necessary where the Deposit Account is
a checking account or other items are to be presented to the Deposit Account for payment. The
secured party, as a "person authorized to draw on the account," should be entitled to give stop
payment orders. See U.C.C. § 4-403(a). Although under UCC section 4-403(a) a stop payment
order from the secured party must identify the relevant items with "reasonable certainty," that
requirement would appear to be met by a stop payment order on all items presented to the
deposit account for payment. A stop payment order is effective for a period of six months unless
the order is oral and is not confirmed in writing within 14 days. See id. § 4-403(b).
9. Upon default, a secured party may instruct a lender to transfer the balance of a deposit
account to or for the secured party's benefit. See R. § 9-607(a)(5).
10. Once again, for the secured party to have "control" over a deposit account, the secured
party must be able to give instructions to the depositary bank as to the disposition of funds in
the deposit account without the further consent of the debtor. See id. § 9-104(a)(2).
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dishonor."
You shall have no duty to inquire or determine whether Lender
is entitled, under any separate agreement between us and Lender, to
give any such instructions.12 By this agreement, we acknowledge and
realize that you may be instructed to transfer funds from the account
at times when we may believe that the Lender is not entitled to give
such instructions, and we accept that risk and request that you honor
the Lender's instructions notwithstanding anything we may say to the
contrary. We further agree to be responsible for your customary
charges and to indemnify you from and to hold you harmless against
any loss, cost, or expense that you may sustain or incur in acting upon
instructions which you believe in good faith to be instructions from
Lender.
Unless you have obtained Lender's prior written consent, you
agree not to exercise any right of recoupment or setoff, or to assert
any security interest or other lien that you may at any time have
against or in any of the Deposit Account Collateral on account of any
credit or other obligation owed to you by us or any other person. You
may, however, from time to time debit the Deposit Account for any
of your customary charges in maintaining the Deposit Account or for
reimbursement for the reversal of any provisional credits granted by
you to the Deposit Account, to the extent, in each case, that we have
not separately paid or reimbursed you therefor.13
11. Normally a bank that fails to pay an item that is properly payable wrongfully dishonors
the item and may be liable to its customer for all damages proximately caused by the dishonor.
See U.C.C. § 4-402.
12. Presumably, the security agreement between the debtor and the secured party will
define the circumstances in which the secured party is entitled to give instructions to the
depositary bank as to the disposition of funds in the deposit account. These circumstances will
generally be reflected in the security agreement as an "event of default." The depositary bank
need not be a party to that security agreement and should not in any event have any duty to
investigate whether an event of default has occurred or to police other compliance by the
secured party or the debtor with the contractual arrangements between the secured party and
the debtor.
13. A depositary bank may provide provisional credits against checks and other items
presented for payment from the deposit account while maintaining rights of recoupment and
setoff against the deposit account. See U.C.C. § 4-201(a). In addition, the depositary bank may
have other rights of recoupment and setoff. See U.C.C. § 1-103. Moreover, where a security
interest in a deposit account is granted by a debtor in favor of the depositary bank, the
depositary bank has "control." See R. § 9-104(a)(1). That security interest in the deposit account
in favor of the debtor's depositary bank attaches and is perfected automatically. See id.
§§ 9-203(b)(3)(D), 9-314(b). Absent subordination by the depositary bank, any security interest
granted by the debtor to the depositary bank in a deposit account in the name of the debtor and
any right of recoupment or setoff that the depositary bank has against the deposit account will
prevail over a security interest in the deposit account perfected by the control of a secured party
who is not the debtor's depositary bank. See id. §§ 9-327(3), 9-340. If the deposit account,
however, is in the name of the secured party as the depositary bank's customer, the secured
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You represent and warrant to Lender that the account
agreement between you and us relating to the establishment and
general operation of the Deposit Account provides, whether
specifically or generally, that the laws of [Revised UCC Article 9
jurisdiction] govern secured transactions relating to the Deposit
Account.14
You covenant with Lender that you will not, without Lender's
prior written consent, amend that account agreement so that secured
transactions relating to the Deposit Account are governed by the law
of another jurisdiction. 5
In addition, you represent and warrant to Lender that you have
not entered, and you covenant with Lender that you will not enter,
into any agreement with any other person by which you are obligated
to comply with instructions from such other person as to the
disposition of funds from the Deposit Account or other dealings with
16
any of the Deposit Account Collateral.

You further represent and warrant to Lender that you maintain
no deposit accounts for us other than the Deposit Account, and you
covenant with Lender that any items or funds received by you for our
account will be credited to the Deposit Account.17
Until you have received instructions from Lender to the
contrary, we shall be entitled to present items"5 drawn on and
party' security interest in the deposit account will prevail over the security interest and rights of
setoff of the depositary bank but not rights of recoupment of the depositary bank. See id.
§§ 9-104(a)(3), 9-327(4), 9-340(c).
14. The local law of the depositary bank's jurisdiction governs perfection of the security
interest, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of the security interest. See R.
§ 9-304(a). That jurisdiction may be the law specified in the deposit account agreement between
the debtor and depositary bank as being the law applicable for purposes of Revised Article 9.
See id. § 9-304(b)(1). Absent such a provision in the deposit account agreement, the bank's
jurisdiction would be typically the jurisdiction set forth in the deposit agreement as the
jurisdiction whose law generally governs the deposit account agreement. See id. § 9-304(b)(2).
(If there is no deposit agreement or the deposit agreement contains no governing law clause, see
Revised section 9-304(b)(3)-(5) to determine the applicable choice of law.) If the account
agreement is not governed by the law of a jurisdiction which has adopted Revised Article 9, a
separate legal analysis of the applicable conflict of laws rules will be necessary to determine
attachment, perfection, the effect of perfection and nonperfection, and priority.
15. The law of the depositary bank's jurisdiction having been determined to be that of a
Revised UCC Article 9 jurisdiction, the debtor and the depositary bank should not be permitted
to change that governing law so as to require application of the laws of a new jurisdiction to
determine perfection, the effect of perfection and nonperfection, and priority.
16. In the event that the depositary bank has entered into another control agreement
relating to the deposit account, the conflicting security interests in the deposit account would
rank according to the priority in time of obtaining control. See R. § 9-327(2).
17. This sentence is suggested depending upon the nature of the financing terms.
18. The reference to the presentation of items, see U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9), would be advisable
where the deposit account is a checking account or other items are to be presented for payment
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otherwise to withdraw or direct the disposition of funds from the
Deposit Account; 19 provided, however, that you and we agree with

Lender that we may not, and you will not permit us to, without
Lender's prior written consent, (i) withdraw any sums from the
Deposit Account if the credit balance of the Deposit Account
remaining would be less than $[Insert Amount] or (ii) close the
Deposit Account. 0
Kindly furnish to Lender, at its address indicated below, copies
of all customary deposit account statements and other information
relating to the Deposit Account that you send to us. We agree to pay
for any excess cost this may entail.

This agreement shall (a) control over any conflicting agreement
between you and us; (b) be governed by the internal law of [Insert
State];21 and (c) not be construed to make Lender the drawer upon

any item drawn against the Deposit Account.
If you agree to and accept the foregoing, please so indicate by
executing and returning to us the enclosed duplicate of this letter.

[Signature of Debtor]
Acknowledged:

[Signature of Depositary Bank]

[Signature of Lender]
from the deposit account. If the deposit account is not a checking account and other items are
not intended to be presented and paid from the deposit account, the references here and
elsewhere in this form of agreement to the presentation of items and to stop payment orders
should be deleted.
19. Normally the debtor, as depositary bank's customer, is entitled to direct the disposition
of funds from the deposit account. This agreement would modify, in favor of the secured party,
the debtor's sole rights as deposit account customer to give such directions.
20. The proviso clauses are suggested depending upon the nature of the financing terms
relating to the collateral security. Perfection claimed by "control" is not defeated merely
because the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account.
See R. § 9-104(b).
21. The jurisdiction chosen should be that of a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction that meets the
"reasonable relationship" test of UCC section 1-105(1).

